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IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED-
ABOLISHING THE USE OF ACQUITTED
CONDUCT IN GUIDELINES SENTENCING
BARRY L. JOHNSON*
Many non-lawyers probably would be surprised to learn that
judges in federal courts are permitted to enhance an offender's
sentence on the basis of conduct for which a jury found the
defendant not guilty at trial. In this Article, Professor Johnson
recommends that the United States Sentencing Commission
correct this anomaly. After providing background information
regarding acquitted conduct and the Sentencing Guidelines,
Professor Johnson examines the acquitted conduct jurisprudence
and the roots of the accepted view that judges may constitutionally
use acquitted conduct to increase a defendant's sentence.
Professor Johnson concludes that even though using acquitted
conduct to increase an offender's punishment is constitutionally
permissible under existing case law, the practice is poor sentencing
policy. He argues that the current regime both offends the spirit
of the Double Jeopardy Clause and diminishes the jury's
important role as fact-finder in the criminal justice system. He
further demonstrates that the Sentencing Commission is the
appropriate body to reform the status quo. With these policies in
mind, Professor Johnson addresses the principal objections to his
position and proposes specific amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines. In short, he proposes that the United States
Sentencing Commission eliminate the use of acquitted conduct to
increase an offender's sentence.
Prior to the adoption of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines"), federal judges generally were permitted to consider,
in sentencing an offender, conduct underlying charges for which that
offender had been acquitted.' In promulgating the Guidelines, the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law. J.D. Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1988. I am grateful to Dennis Arrow, Norwood Beveridge, Richard
Coulson, Art LeFrancios, Suzanne Mitchell, Ilene Nagel, Andy Spiropolous, Ellen Spiro-
polous and Adam Thurschwell for commenting on drafts of this Article, or otherwise
providing intellectual and/or moral support.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439,1444 (4th Cir. 1985); United States
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United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") elected not
to change this practice. Eleven federal courts of appeals have upheld
Guidelines sentence enhancement based on acquitted conduct.' Only
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refuses to
permit district courts to enhance sentences on this basis.
That an offender's sentence may be enhanced, sometimes dra-
matically, on the basis of conduct for which he was acquitted strikes
many as counterintuitive and inappropriate Not surprisingly, some
commentators recently have questioned both the fairness and the le-
gality of permitting sentences to be enhanced on the basis of
acquitted conduct.6 However, discussion of the use of acquitted con-
v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116,1121-22 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134,1136-
37 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972); see also United
States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (expressing reservations about use of
acquitted conduct, but affirming such use in instant case).
Similarly, many state appellate courts permit consideration of acquitted conduct in
sentencing. See, e.g., Egelak v. State, 438 P.2d 712, 717-18 (Alaska 1968); Fair v. State,
268 S.E.2d 316, 320 (Ga. 1980); People v. Jackson, 599 N.E.2d 926, 930-31 (Ill. 1992);
People v. Ewing, 458 N.W.2d 880, 883-84 (Mich. 1990); State v. Baldwin, 629 P.2d 222,
224 (Mont. 1981); State v. Lipsky, 639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1981).
2. The Commission did not directly address the use of acquitted conduct in its Guide-
lines. However, courts generally have inferred from more general Guidelines provisions that
the Commission intended to preserve the availability of acquitted conduct as a basis for sen-
tence enhancement, and the Commission has acquiesced in this interpretation. See infra
notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 635-37 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United
States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rivera-Lopez,
928 F.2d 372, 372-73 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330,
1332-33 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Dawn,
897 F.2d 1444, 1449-50 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir.
1989); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738-39 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Juarez-
Ortega, 866 F.2d 747,748-49 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 608-09 (3d
Cir. 1989).
4. See United States v. Pinkney, 15 F.3d 825, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Brady, 928 F.2d 844,851-52 & n.14 (9th Cir. 1991).
5. As one commentator noted, "Most lawyers, as well as ordinary citizens unfamiliar
with the daily procedures of criminal law administration, are astonished to learn that a per-
son in this society may be sentenced to prison on the basis of conduct of which a jury has
acquitted him." Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unac-
ceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.. 1681,1714 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 350-54 (1992) (urging revision of sentencing procedures and suggesting that use of ac-
quitted conduct evidence may violate double jeopardy or due process provisions); Elizabeth
T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1218-37 (1993) (arguing that use
of acquitted conduct violates Constitution's due process, grand jury and jury trial guaran-
tees); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 523, 550-52 (1993) (urging legislatures and sentencing commissions to reject real-
offense sentencing, including use of acquitted conduct); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Criminal
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duct in sentencing has tended to become lost in the cacophony of
other complaints about the Guidelines.7 Even those commentators
discussing the use of acquitted conduct evidence have tended to do so
in the context of a broader critique.8
This issue has, however, not completely escaped the Commis-
sion's attention. For example, during the 1992-93 amendment cycle,9
the Commission considered, and rejected, two amendments which
would have restricted use of acquitted conduct under the Guide-
lines."° The Commission rejected a similar amendment' the next year
Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional Limits on Criminal Sentencing, 23 SETON
HALL L. REv. 459, 460-61 (1993) (arguing that sentence aggravation based on unconvicted
conduct is unconstitutional); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic and Injustice: Real-Offense Sen-
tencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REv. 403, 433-45 (1993)
(criticizing, on policy grounds, Sentencing Commission's inclusion in the Guidelines of real-
offense sentencing characteristics); William J. Kirchner, Note, Punishment Despite Acquit-
tak An Unconstitutional Aspect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 799,
815-23 (1992) (arguing that use of acquitted conduct constitutes double jeopardy); Elizabeth
A. Parsons, Note, Shifting the Balance of Power: Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 417, 457-68 (1994) (recommending amendment
to Guidelines to restrict use of unadjudicated conduct). But see Joshua M. Webber, Note,
United States v. Brady: Should Sentencing Courts Reconsider Disputed Acquitted Conduct
for Enhancement Purposes Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 46 ARK. L. REv. 457,
468-73 (1993) (criticizing Brady and defending the use of acquitted conduct in Guidelines
sentencing).
7. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CFH. L. REV. 901, 939-49 (1991) (arguing that Guidelines are too mecha-
nistic); Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 771,772-77 (1992) (arguing that Guidelines are too harsh and transfer discre-
tion to prosecutors); Marc Miller, True Grid. Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAvIs L.
REv. 587, 590-604 (1992) (suggesting that Guidelines are too complex); Stanley Weigel, The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 99-103 (1988)
(same); Jose Cabranes, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, Remarks at
the University of Chicago Law School 13 (Jan. 15, 1992) (transcript on file with author)
(arguing that Guidelines are too mechanistic).
8. See, ag., Herman, supra note 6, at 350-54 (providing general critique of fairness of
sentencing procedures and suggesting that current case law has been insufficiently attentive
to serious due process and double jeopardy concerns); Lear, supra note 6, at 1218-37
(arguing that use of unconvicted conduct violates Constitution's due process, grand jury and
jury trial guarantees); Reitz, supra note 6, at 558-65 (giving policy-based critique of real-
offense sentencing). Few commentators have focused specifically on the issue of acquitted
conduct. But see Kirchner, supra note 6, at 814-24 (arguing that use of acquitted conduct
constitutes double jeopardy).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) requires the Commission to promulgate and forward to Congress
no later than May 1st each year any new guidelines or amendments to the Guidelines it in-
tends to take effect that year. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1994)These promulgated guidelines
become effective the following November 1, unless Congress modifies or disapproves them.
See id. The Commission's annual consideration of proposed amendments is structured
around this schedule, and is referred to within the Commission as the amendment cycle.
10. Proposed Amendment 1 would have revised section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing
Guidelines, the relevant conduct provision, to specify that "[c]onduct of which the defendant
has been acquitted after trial shall not be considered under this section." 57 Fed. Reg.
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as well. 2
The principal thesis of this Article is that the Commission should
reassess its position on the use of acquitted conduct evidence and
amend the Guidelines to eliminate the use of such evidence as a basis
for sentence enhancement. Part I of this Article provides back-
ground on the nature of acquitted conduct and the mechanics of its
use in Guidelines sentencing. Next, Part II explores the acquitted
conduct jurisprudence, both before and after adoption of the Guide-
lines, addressing the origins of the prevailing view that the
Constitution permits punishment arising from acquitted conduct.
Part III then argues that sentence enhancement under the Guidelines
on the basis of acquitted conduct is inappropriate sentencing policy.
It explains that, regardless of its constitutional status, the current rule
(1) is inconsistent with important policies underlying the prohibition
against double jeopardy; and (2) denigrates the central fact-finding
role of the jury in the criminal justice system. Part III also demon-
strates that the Commission is the appropriate body to enact reforms
to address the problems created by use of acquitted conduct at sen-
tencing. Finally, Part IV offers specific recommendations for
amendments to the Guidelines to eliminate use of acquitted conduct.
Part IV also outlines the principal objections to barring consideration
62,832, 62,832 (proposed Dec. 31, 1992). This proposed amendment also added an applica-
tion note to the commentary explaining that acquitted conduct could, however, "provide a
basis for an upward departure" in "an exceptional case." Id.
Proposed Amendment 35, published at the request of the Practitioner's Advisory
Group, also would have revised section 1B1.3 to limit the use of acquitted conduct. It
contained two options for comment, the first of which read: "Conduct of which a defen-
dant has been acquitted after a court or jury trial shall not be considered under this
section." Id. at 62,848. Option two read: "Conduct of which a defendant has been acquit-
ted after a court or jury trial shall not be considered under this section unless the
Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has committed
the conduct for which he/she has been acquitted." Id.
These amendments were two of sixty-six amendments published for public comment
in the 1992-93 amendment cycle. The Commission rejected Proposed Amendments 1 and
35 by a vote of three to two. See Notes of Apr. 6, 1993, Sentencing Commission Meeting
(on file with author) [hereinafter 1993 Commission Meeting].
11. Proposed Amendment 18 would have amended section 1B1.3 by inserting the fol-
lowing additional subsection: "(c) Conduct of which the defendant has been acquitted after
a court or jury trial shall not be considered under this section. However, such conduct, if
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, may provide the basis for an upward depar-
ture." 58 Fed. Reg. 67,522, 67,541 (proposed Dec. 21,1993).
12. See Notes of Apr. 14, 1994, Sentencing Commission Meeting (on file with author).
This vote was closer than the one taken the previous year, with three Commissioners voting
in favor of the amendment, one against and one abstaining. See id This fell short of the four
votes necessary for Commission action, so the amendment failed. See Naftali Bendavid,
Sentencing Commission at the Brink, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1994, at Al (describing Com-
mission's inability to enact amendments on the basis of three votes).
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of acquitted conduct and offers responses to these objections.
I. ACQUITTED CONDuCr AND GUIDELINES SEN4TENCING
A. Defining the Problem: The Nature of Acquitted Conduct and Its
Use in Sentencing
This Article addresses the use of acquitted conduct in Guidelines
sentencing. In this Article, the term "acquitted conduct" refers to
acts for which the offender was criminally charged and formally ad-
judicated not guilty, typically by the finder of fact after trial." Any
reliance on such acts by the sentencing judge as a basis for enhancing
an offender's sentence constitutes "use" of acquitted conduct. 4
Acquitted conduct encompasses both criminal conduct alleged to
have occurred contemporaneously with the charges of conviction 5
and alleged prior criminal conduct. 6 Consideration of contempora-
neous conduct would occur, of course, only in cases in which the
defendant is adjudicated guilty of some charges and not guilty of oth-
ers.17
Acquitted conduct is distinct from unadjudicated conduct. The
latter refers to conduct potentially characterized as criminal for
which the offender's legal guilt has not been formally adjudicated,
13. The term also encompasses conduct underlying charges dismissed upon a motion for
acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which may be granted
where "the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a). Of
course, it would be a rare case in which a judge would dismiss a count under Rule 29(a), but
proceed to find for sentencing purposes that the defendant engaged in the conduct underly-
ing the dismissed count.
14. Use of acquitted conduct at sentencing raises troubling questions because it is tan-
tamount to a redetermination by the sentencing judge, implicit or explicit, of material facts
resolved to the defendant's benefit at trial. See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
Certainly it is not always easy to determine the precise scope of the fact finder's verdict,
because judgments of acquittal are typically based on general verdicts. The issue is analo-
gous to that faced in assessing the scope of a prior acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. In
that situation, the Supreme Court has held that courts must determine the scope of the prior
verdict by "examin[ing] the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the plead-
ings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter," to determine "whether a rational jury
could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to
foreclose from consideration." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,444 (1970). However, in most
cases in which the issue of acquitted conduct is likely to arise, judges should be able to de-
termine with little difficulty whether the jury resolved the issue in the defendant's favor. See
infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
17. For example, the jury may find the defendant guilty of drug trafficking, but not
guilty of use of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense. See infra notes 52-56 and
accompanying text.
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either through trial or guilty plea.18 Although some commentators
have criticized the Guidelines' reliance on both acquitted and unad-
judicated conduct, 9 this Article argues that the use of acquitted
conduct in sentencing raises unique policy considerations which dis-
tinguish its use from that of unadjudicated conduct, and which
require special rules governing its use in the federal sentencing
scheme.'
B. The Mechanics of Guidelines Sentencing and the Role of
Acquitted Conduct
Consideration of acquitted conduct in Guidelines sentence cal-
culation typically occurs in one of two ways: (1) as part of the
offender's "relevant conduct" used to calculate the Guidelines sen-
tencing range, or "GSR"; or (2) as a basis for departure, or
imposition of a sentence outside the GSR.
1. How the Guidelines Work
The Guidelines employ a matrix, with the applicable sentencing
range derived from an intersection of the defendant's total "offense
level" and "criminal history category."" The offense level, repre-
sented by the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table, is calculated by
first determining the defendant's "base offense level," which is based
on the offense of conviction. Adjustments to that base offense level
are then made to account for aggravating and mitigating facts or cir-
cumstances associated with the offender's conduct.' The resulting
18. Acquitted conduct and unadjudicated conduct are similar in that both involve con-
sideration of alleged criminal activity for which the defendant has not been convicted. In
that sense, they are two branches of a broader category referred to in this Article as uncon-
victed offense conduct.
19. See, e.g., Lear, supra note 6, at 1208-37 (arguing that reliance on unconvicted of-
fenses is unconstitutional); Reitz, supra note 6, at 547-65 (urging adoption of conviction-
offense model of sentencing, precluding use of unconvicted conduct); Rosenberg, supra note
6, at 498-507 (arguing that sentence aggravation based on unconvicted conduct is inconsis-
tent with due process foundations of reasonable doubt standard).
20. See infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
21. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A tbl. (1995); see also infra
Appendix I (depicting the sentencing table).
22. For example, a defendant convicted of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) has a
base offense level of twenty under the applicable robbery guideline, U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1. The robbery guideline contains a number of specific offense
characteristics which affect the total offense level. For instance, it provides for a two point
enhancement if the robbery involves a financial institution. See Id. § 2B3.1(b)(1). If, in the
course of the offense, a firearm was brandished, displayed or possessed, the offense level is
increased by five points. See id. § 2B3.1(b)(2). If any victim suffered bodily injury, the of-
fense level is increased by two to six points, depending upon the extent of the injury. See id.
[Vol. 75
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total offense level, expressed as a number between one and forty-
three,' represents a numerical assessment of the seriousness of the
offender's offense-related conduct. The horizontal axis of the Sen-
tencing Table represents the offender's criminal history category,
which is based on the number and seriousness of the defendant's sen-
tences for prior convictions. 4
The applicable GSR is determined by the intersection of the to-
tal offense level and criminal history category on the Sentencing
Table matrix. This point on the Sentencing Table yields a range ex-
pressed in months of imprisonment.' The sentencing judge must
impose a sentence from within that range, unless aggravating or miti-
gating circumstances are present which are not adequately taken into
account by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines, and the
presence of these factors warrants a sentence outside the Guidelines
range.'
2. Relevant Conduct and Modified Real-Offense Sentencing under
the Guidelines
An offender's sentence under the Guidelines is based not merely
upon the acts constituting the offense of conviction, but also on
"relevant conduct," or unlawful acts or omissions, other than those
constituting the offense of conviction, that occurred in relation to the
§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(A)-(E). If the loss to the bank is greater than $10,000 but less than $50,000,
another point is added. See id. § 2B3.1(b)(6).
In addition to the specific offense characteristics contained in the Chapter Two
Guidelines provisions governing particular offenses, Chapter Three of the Guidelines
Manual contains a number of generally applicable adjustments, dealing with such issues
as the defendant's role in the offense, obstruction of justice, and acceptance of responsi-
bility. See id. §8 3A1.1-E1.1. For example, section 3B1.2 provides for offense level
reductions of two, three, or four levels if the defendant's role in the offense is minimal or
minor. See id. § 3B1.2. Section 3B1.3 provides for a two level upward adjustment if the de-
fendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill in committing or
concealing the offense. See id. § 3B1.3.
If the hypothetical bank robbery defendant described above brandished a firearm,
punched a teller in the face causing minor injury, and fled with $40,000, and no Chapter
Three adjustments applied, the total offense level would be 30.
23. See id. ch. 5, pt. A tbl.; see also infra Appendix I (depicting the sentencing table).
24. Thus, if the bank robber described in note 22 had one prior bank robbery conviction
which had resulted in a prison sentence of two years, he would receive three criminal history
points, see id. § 4Al.l(a), placing him in the criminal history category of II. See id. ch. 5, pt.
A tbl. ; see also infra Appendix I (depicting the sentencing table).
25. In the bank robbery example described above, the defendant's total offense level
of 30 and criminal history category of II results in a Guidelines sentence of 108 to 135
months imprisonment. See id. ch. 5, pt. A tbl. ; see also infra Appendb I (depicting the sen-
tencing table).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
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offense of conviction.' Relevant conduct includes a vast array of ac-
tivity related to the offense of conviction and deemed pertinent to
the offender's culpability, such as use of a firearm in commission of
the underlying offense,2 infliction of extreme psychological injury,"9
selection of an especially vulnerable victim,' or commission of simi-
lar offenses, including unadjudicated offenses, as part of the "same
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of con-
viction."'"
In choosing to incorporate relevant conduct into the calculation
of the Guidelines sentence, the Commission rejected a "charge of-
fense" system, in which the sentence would be based exclusively on
the offense for which the offender was charged and convicted. 2 The
27. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELnES MANuAL § 1B1.3 (1995). The Guideline pro-
vides in relevant part:
§ 1B1.3 Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)
(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless
otherwise specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline
specifies more than one base offense level, (ii) specific offense charac-
teristics and (iii) cross references in Chapter Two, and (iv)
adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the basis of the
following:
(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the de-
fendant; and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity... all rea-
sonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense;
(2) ... all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and
(1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in sub-
sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object
of such acts and omissions; and
(4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline.
Id.
2& See, eg., id § 2B3.1(b)(2) (increasing sentence for possession or use of a firearm or
dangerous weapon in connection with a robbery); id § 2D1.1(b)(1) (increasing sentence for
possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug trafficking offense); id. § 512.6
(Policy Statement) (authorizing upward departure for use or possession of a weapon or dan-
gerous instrumentality). For an example, see infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
29. See U.S. SENTENCING GtumJEUNEs MANuAL. § 5K2.3 (Policy Statement).
30. See id § 3A1.1 (adjusting upward two offense levels for vulnerable victim).
31. Ia § 1B1.3.
32. Under a pure charge offense system, every individual charged and convicted under a
particular statute would receive the same sentence, without regard to the particular facts of
the individual cases. Mandatory minimum sentencing provisions have some of the charac-
[Vol. 75
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Commission determined that the purposes of sentencing are best
served if the sentence reflects the full panoply of the offender's harm-
ful behavior.3 3 It also expressed concern that a charge offense system
would make Guidelines sentencing outcomes too dependent upon
prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining decisions.3
At the same time, the Commission expressly rejected a pure
"real offense" system in which the offense of conviction would be
largely irrelevant to sentencing outcome, determining that such a sys-
tem would create major problems of workability and fairness. 35 It
opted instead for "a system that blends the constraints of the offense
of conviction with the reality of the defendant's actual offense con-
duct in order to gauge the seriousness of that conduct for sentencing
purposes."' This hybrid, characterized by former U.S. Sentencing
Commissioner Nagel as a "modified real offense" approach, begins
with consideration of the offense(s) of conviction, used as the starting
point in selecting the appropriate offense guideline from Chapter
Two of the Guidelines Manual, and the accompanying base offense
level. This base offense level is then modified in light of real-offense
aggravating and mitigating factors relating to the offense and the of-
fender.3' Real-offense factors also are introduced into Guidelines
sentence calculation through cross-references within the Guidelines,39
teristics of a pure charge offense system because they require a certain minimum sentence
for offenders convicted of violating certain statutes, regardless of the presence of potentially
mitigating factors.
33. See, eg., William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct The Corner-
stone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495,504 (1990) (arguing that "the
sentence imposed should also reflect conduct both preparatory and subsequent to the of-
fense in order to be consistent with the purposes of sentencing"); see also Ilene H. Nagel,
Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMNOLOGY 883, 925 n.228 (1990) (explaining that real-offense approach permits a
"judge to differentiate between seemingly alike offenders whose offense behavior is actually
quite different").
34. See, eg., Nagel, supra note 33, at 925-26 n.228 (noting that the modified real-offense
system was adopted by the Commission because a pure charge offense system "inherently
transfers sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors"); see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, ch. 1, pt. A (4)(A), at 1.6
(Apr. 13, 1987) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N] (stating that a charge offense sys-
tem has the "potential to turn over to the prosecutor the power to determine the sentence by
increasing or decreasing the number (or content) of the counts in an indictment").
35. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 34, ch. 1, pt. A (4)(A), at 1.5 (stating
that Commission rejected 1986 draft based on pure real-offense sentencing scheme due to
lack of practical means of implementation and inability to reconcile with need for fair adju-
dicatory procedure).
36. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 33, at 497.
37. See Nagel, supra note 33, at 925.
38. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
39. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1) (1995) (providing that
1996]
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and through rules for calculation of the base offense level, which in-
corporate conduct that is "part of the same course of conduct, or
common scheme or plan as the offense or of conviction. '
3. "Acquitted Conduct" As "Relevant Conduct"
The Guidelines, including the relevant conduct provisions, con-
tain no specific language authorizing use of acquitted conduct
evidence in sentencing." However, courts have construed the lan-
guage and commentary of sections 1B1.3 and 1B1.4 as sufficiently
broad to authorize the use of such evidence.2
Section 1B1.3 permits consideration of three specified categories
of relevant conduct, all of which are couched in terms sufficiently
broad to embrace acquitted conduct: (1) "all acts and omissions
committed" during the offense of conviction, its preparation, or in
post-offense efforts in avoiding detection; (2) for certain types of of-
fenses, 3 "all acts and omissions" that were "part of the same course
of conduct or common scheme or plan"; and (3) "all harm" resulting
from the acts and omissions specified in the first two relevant conduct
categories."A Commentary to section 1B1.3 also specifies that the
Commission intended some form of unconvicted offense conduct to
be considered as relevant conduct under the Guidelines."
cross-references in Chapter Two shall be determined on the basis of "all acts and omissions
committed, aided, abetted ... by the defendant ... that occurred during the commission of
the offense of conviction"). For example, in United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.
1992), the Seventh Circuit held that the Guidelines section 2El.1 (a) (2) required the court to
consider the murder of the defendant's wife, for which he was acquitted, in calculating the
defendant's sentence for his racketeering conviction. See id. at 284-85; see also United States
v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring sentencing judge to consider
acquitted drug trafficking activity in calculating defendant's sentence for illegal possession of
a firearm).
40. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2) (1995). For an example
of the operation of relevant conduct in determination of base offense levels in drug traffick-
ing cases, see infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F2d 624, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) ("The Guidelines do not specifically mention acts
underlying counts on which the defendant has been acquitted."); see also Kirchner, supra
note 6, at 808 n.101 ("Indeed, the Guidelines themselves do not specifically mention acquit-
ted conduct as a basis for enhancement.").
42. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
43. Specifically, those for which the base offense level is determined largely by quantity,
such as drug trafficking offenses under Chapter 2D (drug quantity), or fraud offenses under
Chapter 2F (dollar loss amount). See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2(d)
(1995) (specifying provisions for which "the offense level is determined largely on the basis
of the total amount of harm or loss").
44. See id. § 1B1.3 (emphasis added).
45. The comment states: "Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of
the offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sen-
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Section 1B1.4 contains similarly broad language regarding the in-
formation that may be considered in calculating the GSR.' As with
section 1B1.3, commentary to this provision establishes that the
Commission contemplated the use of unconvicted offense conduct by
sentencing judges.'
These two provisions establish clearly that sentencing courts may
take into account a broad range of conduct for which no conviction
was obtained. There is no limiting language suggesting that the
Commission intended to treat acquitted conduct differently than any
other form of unconvicted conduct. Consequently, courts have inter-
preted the Commission's broad language referring generally to
unconvicted offense conduct, together with its failure to treat acquit-
ted conduct separately, as establishing the Commission's intent to
permit courts to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing.s Further
support for this interpretation of the Guidelines is provided by pre-
Guidelines practice, which embraced real-offense sentencing, in-
cluding use of acquitted conduct.49 In effect, the courts have
concluded that if the Commission intended to alter past practice by
limiting the use of acquitted conduct evidence, it could have done so
explicitly.
Whatever the merits of this argument as an interpretation of the
Commission's original intent, the Commission's rejection of proposed
amendments reflecting a contrary approach suggests that the Com-
mission has adopted, by implication, this interpretation of its
tencing range." Id § 1B1.3 cmt.
46. The section provides that "the court may consider, without limitation, any informa-
tion concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant." Id § 1B1.4.
47. The commentary to section 1B1.4 provides:
A court is not precluded from considering information that the guidelines do not
take into account. For example, if the defendant committed two robberies, but
as part of a plea negotiation entered a guilty plea to only one, the robbery that
was not taken into account by the guidelines would provide a reason for sen-
tencing at the top of the guideline range.
Id. § 1B1.4 cmt.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624,635 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that the
Guidelines' relevant conduct language "is certainly broad enough to include acts underlying
offenses of which the defendant has been acquitted"); United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d
1330, 1332 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that nothing in the Guidelines "prevents a judge from
taking account of conduct in which the defendant engaged, whether or not an acquittal pre-
vents the imposition of criminal penalties directly on that conduct").
49. See Boney, 977 F.2d at 645 (Randolph, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(stating that the "widespread practice" of using acquitted conduct in Guidelines sentencing
"comports generally with the systetih prevailing prior to the Guidelines"); see also Reitz,
supra note 6, at 525 (noting that real-offense sentencing in some form has existed in the
United States since colonial times).
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Guidelines.' In any event, it is beyond question that sentence en-
hancement through acquitted conduct is an entrenched feature of the
Guidelines.
4. Common Uses of Acquitted Conduct under the Guidelines
Acquitted conduct may be considered either as relevant conduct
used to determine an offender's GSR, or as a basis for a decision to
depart from the GSR and impose a more severe sentence." There
are numerous examples in the case law of these uses of acquitted
conduct, the most typical of which are described below.
a. Acquitted Conduct and Calculation of the GSR
Probably the most common use of acquitted conduct in setting
the GSR is imposition of the two-level enhancement for firearm pos-
session under section 2D1.1 after acquittal on related firearms
charges. For example, in United States v. Pineda,2 the police ar-
rested the defendant after executing a search warrant and discovering
in a closet in his apartment building sixty-one grams of heroin, a bal-
ance scale, cash, and a red duffel bag containing two weapons. 3
Pineda was tried and convicted of drug trafficking, but was acquitted
on the separate charge of using and carrying a firearm in relation to a
drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).' Despite
the acquittal on the § 924(c) count, in calculating Pineda's offense
level, the sentencing court imposed a two-level enhancement for pos-
session of a weapon in connection with a drug trafficking offense.5
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld this
enhancement.56
Acquitted conduct may influence the GSR in other ways as well.
For example, courts sometimes include as relevant conduct drug
charges from counts of acquittal when calculating the drug quantities
50. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's rejection of
proposed amendments to restrict use of acquitted conduct in Guidelines sentencing).
51. See infra notes 52-87 and accompanying text.
52. 981 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1992).
53. See id. at 571.
54. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) ("Whoever, during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition
to the punishment provided for such crime, ... be sentenced to imprisonment for five
years .... ).
55. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1995) (providing for
two-level enhancement to base offense level "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)
was possessed").
56. See Pineda, 981 F.2d at 572-74.
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upon which Guidelines drug sentences are based 57 United States v.
BoneyS is a prime example. In Boney, two co-defendants, Boney and
Holloman, were each convicted of distribution of 0.199 grams of
crack cocaine. 9 Boney was also convicted on a second count of pos-
sessing with intent to distribute an additional 12.72 grams of crack
cocaine.6 Holloman was acquitted on the latter charge. 1 Neverthe-
less, the sentencing judge calculated Holloman's sentence not merely
on the basis of the 0.199 grams of crack involved in his offense of
conviction, but on the basis of the full 12.919 grams used to calculate
co-defendant Boney's sentence.62 The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit upheld this as a permissible application of
the "same course of conduct or common scheme or plan" language in
section 1B1.3.6
b. Acquitted Conduct and Departure
Acquitted conduct also is permitted as a basis for a "departure"
-that is, the imposition of a sentence outside the presumptively ap-
plicable Guidelines range. ' The Sentencing Reform Act permits
sentencing judges to depart from the Guidelines range if "there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described." ' Courts have analyzed the permissi-
bility of acquittal-based departures in much the sanie way as they
have analyzed acquittal-based relevant conduct,66 holding that the
Commission's use of broad, inclusive language, together with the ab-
sence of an exception for acquitted conduct, warrants the conclusion
that acquitted conduct is a permissible basis for upward departure.
The general departure language of section 5K2.0 indicates that a
57. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(a)(3), (c) tbl. (1995).
58. 977 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
59. See id at 627-28.
60. See id.
61. See i. A third defendant, Marks, was acquitted on all charges. See i.
62. See id. at 635. As a result, the court calculated Holloman's sentencing range as 63 to
78 months, rather than the 10 to 16 month range that would have applied had the court used
only the 0.199 grams associated with the offense of conviction. See id.
63. Id. at 635-36; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELNES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (1995).
64. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
66. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
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wide array of factors may warrant departure." The Commission also
explained that, with a few specific exceptions, it did not intend to
limit the kinds of factors that constitute grounds for departure." The
breadth of information that may serve as a basis for departure is fur-
ther supported by the "no limitations" language of section 1B1.47
and commentary to section 1B1.3 which establishes that "[t]he range
of information that may be considered at sentencing is broader than
the range of information upon which the applicable sentencing range
is determined., 71  Federal courts looking to these provisions have
concluded that acquitted conduct may serve as a basis for departure.7
The use of acquitted conduct as a basis for departure may involve
either offense-based departure arising from acquitted conduct con-
temporaneous with the charged offense,7 or from criminal history-
based departure arising from consideration of acquittal on previously
adjudicated charges. 4
United States v. Ryan75 is a good example of the use of "related
charge acquittal" evidence. Ryan was tried on one count of posses-
sion of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).7 ' The jury acquitted him on that charge, but con-
victed him of the lesser included offense of simple possession."
Citing the amount and purity of the drugs and the defendant's man-
ner of packaging them, the sentencing judge departed upward from
68. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0.
69. See iat ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b). The Commission recognized that the circumstances which
might necessitate departure from the GSR were sufficiently numerous and varied that they
cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance. See Id.
Moreover, when the Commission has intended to bar certain grounds for departure, it has
not hesitated to do so in clear language. See, e.g., Id § 5H1.10 (providing that race, sex, na-
tional origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status "are not relevant in the
determination of a sentence"); id. § 5H1.12 (providing that lack of guidance as a youth and
similar factors "are not relevant grounds for imposing a sentence outside the applicable
guideline range").
70. See id § 1B1.4 (providing that "the court may consider, without limitation, any in-
formation concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant").
71. Id § 1B1.3 cmt. at 23.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604,608-09 (3d Cir. 1989). But see United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d
844, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that acquitted conduct may not serve as a basis for up-
ward departure).
73. This may be termed a "related charge acquittal." For an example, see infra notes
75-80 and accompanying text.
74. This might be termed a "prior charge acquittal." For an example, see infra notes 81-
87 and accompanying text.
75. 866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir. 1989).




the prescribed GSR of zero to six months, imposing a ten month sen-
tence." Thus, Ryan's sentence was four months higher than the
maximum Guidelines sentence for the count of conviction alone.79
This four month differential can be explained only by reference to
the acquitted conduct.'s
United States v. Fonner81 is an example of a departure based on a
prior charge acquittal. Fonner was convicted of mailing death threats
to a police officer and a judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876. 2 The
sentencing judge calculated Fonner's GSR at thirty to thirty-seven
months, but elected to depart to the statutory maximum of 120
months.' The judge cited as one ground for departure Guidelines
section 4A1.3, the inadequacy of Fonner's criminal history category,s'
explaining that Fonner's prior acquittal of a 1972 killing of a police
officer caused Fonner's criminal history score to reflect inadequately
the extent of his prior transgressions and propensity to commit fur-
ther violent crimes.' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing on the ground
that the district court did not adequately justify the extent of the de-
parture.' However, it held specifically that the district judge did not
err in considering the 1972 killing in assessing the adequacy of Fon-
78. See id.
79. See iL
80. One of the arresting officers testified that Ryan possessed 33 individual packages of
crack. See 1d. He opined that this packaging suggested that the crack was for distribution,
not for personal use. See id. The court's reliance on packaging when departing up to a 10
month sentence suggests an implicit rejection of the jury's verdict on the distribution charge.
The Third Circuit's analysis indicates that it viewed the lower court's departure in this man-
ner. See id. at 609 (holding that a sentencing judge is permitted to consider evidence on
counts of which the defendant was acquitted in departing upward from the Guidelines
range).
81. 920 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1991).
82. See id- at 1331.
83. See id.
84. This section permits a judge to depart upward "[i]f reliable information indicates
that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defen-
dant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes."
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (1995).
85. See Fonner, 920 F.2d at 1331. The district judge cited three other grounds for up-
ward departure, which were both based on inadequacy of Fonner's criminal history category.
First, he noted that Fonner had eight convictions for unrelated charges which were not in-
cluded in the criminal history score because they were more than 10 years old. See id.
Second, he found that Fonner's mental instability rendered him more likely than most to
commit additional offenses. See id. Third, the defendant previously received a 10-year sen-
tence for the prior threats and the judge felt a lesser sentence than the earlier one would be
disparate. See iL
86. See id. at 1332.
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ner's criminal history score, despite his acquittal on murder charges
arising from that killing.
II. THE ABSENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE
OF ACQUITrED CONDUCT
A long line of pre-Guidelines case law affirmed the constitution-
ality of considering acquitted conduct at sentencing.' This case law
has been quite influential in the appellate courts' rejection of consti-
tutional challenges to the use of acquitted conduct under the
Guidelines.' Courts addressing constitutional challenges to the
Guidelines' use of acquitted conduct also have been influenced by
related jurisprudential developments, both before and after imple-
mentation of the Guidelines, which have reinforced the hostility of
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence toward challenges to use
of acquitted conduct. This section explores how the courts have
come to reject constitutional challenges to the use of acquitted con-
duct, a rejection which necessitates action by Congress or the
Commission to alter current Guidelines sentencing practices.
A. Pre-Guidelines Case Law on Acquitted Conduct
In order to understand the pre-Guidelines acquitted conduct ju-
risprudence, it is necessary to recall the then-prevailing federal
sentencing practices, which formed the background against which
those cases were decided. Prior to adoption of the Guidelines, fed-
eral sentencing judges possessed virtually unlimited discretion to
impose any sentence within the (typically broad) statutory range ap-
plicable to the offense of conviction." Formal factual findings were
not required.91 Indeed, sentencing judges were not required to ar-
ticulate in any manner the factors that influenced the chosen
sentence. 92 Furthermore, appellate review of sentencing was virtually
non-existent. Thus, district judges could (and usually did) impose
87. See id at 1332-33.
88. See supra note 1 (listing cases in which judges were permitted to use acquitted con-
duct prior to the Guidelines).
89. See infra notes 101-16 and accompanying text.
90. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (stating that "a sentence im-
posed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to
review").
91. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 6 (1972).
92. See, eg., United States v. Castillo-Roman, 774 F.2d 1280,1283 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[A]
sentencing court is not required to enunciate the reasons underlying its decision.").
93. See YTcker, 404 U.S. at 447.
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sentences without articulating either the particular facts influencing
their sentencing decisions or the quantitative impact of these factors
on the resulting sentences."
This broad discretion of sentencing judges was grounded in the
prevailing penal philosophy of the time, which emphasized indeter-
minate sentencing and rehabilitation of the offender.95 Consistent
with this philosophy and the nearly unfettered discretion in sentence
selection associated with it, judges were encouraged to consider a
vast array of facts relevant to the conduct and character of the defen-
dant, including facts that would be inadmissible at trial." As the
Supreme Court explained in Williams v. New York,7 selection of the
appropriate sentence requires "possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. ' '" The
information relevant to sentencing might include inadmissible hear-
say, illegally seized evidence, and evidence of uncharged conduct, as
well as evidence relating to charges of which the defendant was ac-
quitted by a jury.' Because the goal of sentencing was rehabilitation,
and rehabilitation requires adequate information, the usual limita-
tions on sources of evidence and standards of proof were deemed
94. See Frankel, supra note 91, at 6 n.17 ("Most sentences are passed without articulated
reasons, probably without reasons the judge articulates with much precision even to him-
self.").
95. Justice Black, writing for the majority in Williams v. New York, explained:
Undoubtedly the New York statutes [under which the defendant was found
guilty and sentenced] emphasize a prevalent modem philosophy of penology
that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. The belief
no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.
Modem changes in the treatment of offenders make it more necessary now
than a century ago for observance of the distinctions in the evidential procedure
in the trial and sentencing processes. For indeterminate sentences and proba-
tion have resulted in an increase in the discretionary powers exercised in fixing
punishments.
337 U.S. 241,247, 248-49 (1949) (citations omitted).
For a discussion of rehabilitation-based indeterminate sentencing and the problems
associated with it, see FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE
IDEAL (1968); see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at 37-38 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3220-21 (criticizing use of incarceration as means to achieve rehabili-
tation of criminal offenders).
96. See, e.g., Williams, 337 U.S. at 246-47. The Williams holding was codified in 1970, in
a provision which specified that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concern-
ing the background, character and conduct of a person" being sentenced. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661 (1994).
97. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
98. Id at 247.
99. See United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972).
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legally irrelevant.'
The leading pre-Guidelines case on the use of acquitted conduct
in sentencing, United States v. Sweig,'0 ' demonstrates the influence of
the then-prevailing rehabilitative ethos and the judicial discretion
associated with it. Sweig involved an appeal from a sentence of thirty
months, imposed on a senior congressional staffer convicted of one
count of perjury on a total of fifteen counts alleged at trial."° In the
course of a lengthy statement at the sentencing proceeding, Judge
Marvin E. Frankel, Jr. stated that he based Sweig's sentence in part
on evidence presented at trial relating to the counts for which Sweig
had been acquitted.' 3 This evidence tended to show that Sweig was,
according to Judge Frankel, part of "a picture of corruption of a very
profound kind.""
Sweig appealed, contending that the sentence violated his rights
because he was, in effect, being punished for crimes of which the jury
had acquitted him.' In rejecting Sweig's claims, the court did not
articulate an affirmative policy justification for enhancing a sentence
on the basis of acquitted conduct. Rather, the court noted initially
that "[a] sentencing judge has very broad discretion in imposing any
sentence within the statutory limits, and in exercising that discretion
he may and should consider matters that would not be admissible at
100. See Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Con-
stitutional Significance of the "Elements of the Sentence," 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 157
(1993) ("The absence of procedural protections [such as the reasonable doubt standard or
the opportunity to confront witnesses] may well have been reasonable when sentencing was
not a truly legal decision [but was] a discretionary [decision] dominated by at least a rhetoric
of rehabilitation."); Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at
Sentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need for an Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 96, 96 (1992) ("Non-observance of evidentiary restrictions made perfect
sense in a system that stressed rehabilitation and expected the judge to assess all available
information in order to choose a sanction appropriate to the particular defendant.").
101. 454F.2d 181,183-84 (2d Cir. 1972).
102. See id at 181-82. Along with the perjury count on which Sweig was convicted, the
prosecution charged him with illegal influence peddling, misuse of government facilities,
abuse of government trust, and additional perjury counts. See id at 181-83.
103. See id. at 182 n.2.
104. Id. at 182. In addressing Sweig, Judge Frankel stated:
"[T]here was substantial evidence at the trial which indicated gross irregu-
larities, misuse of government facilities, abuse of government trust, and
whatever [your attorney] has said about the counts on which you were acquitted,
I think it is appropriate, and I state for the record the view that I [sic] not ignore
those things in considering this delicate question of [s]entence."
Id. at 182 n.2.
105. See id. at 182-83. The specific constitutional grounds for Sweig's objection to use of
acquitted conduct are not clear from the Second Circuit's opinion. Thus, it is uncertain
which constitutional challenges the court rejected.
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trial."1"6 The court further reasoned that acquitted conduct evidence
was analogous to other types of evidence that may be used at sen-
tencing, but not at trial, such as illegally seized evidence, inadmissible
hearsay, and unadjudicated conduct." It was unpersuaded by the
argument that acquitted conduct is materially different because it in-
volves relitigation of previously decided issues."6 According to the
Sweig court, acquittal "does not have the effect of conclusively estab-
lishing the untruth of all the evidence introduced against the
defendant... [because] the jury may have believed all such evidence
to be true, but have found that some essential element of the charge
was not proved."1"
Other courts adopted the holding in Sweig, although many of
these cases involved slightly different fact situations, such as consid-
eration of prior acquittals as part of an assessment of the defendant's
criminal history,"' or consideration of prior convictions overturned
on appeal."1 In addition, the Sweig rule was cited favorably in dicta
in a number of cases in which the sentencing court was deemed not to
have relied upon acquitted conduct to enhance the defendant's sen-
tence.'2
Most of the courts following Sweig did not articulate an affirma-
tive rationale to justify permitting use of acquitted conduct evidence
at sentencing. For example, in United States v. Bernard," the Fourth
Circuit permitted the district court to consider acquitted conduct
106. Id. at 183-84.
107. See id. at 184.
108. See id.
109. Id. The court explained that acquitted conduct evidence "may often be more reli-
able than the hearsay evidence to which the sentencing judge is clearly permitted to turn"
because of the availability of cross-examination and the judge's opportunity to view the de-
meanor of the witnesses. See id This reference to factual reliability is the closest thing to a
policy argument in favor of acquitted conduct articulated by the Sweig court.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 152 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(surveying case law and noting that the acquitted conduct issue "usually concerns whether
the sentencing judge may consider a defendant's acquittal in a prior trial, rather than the
evidence introduced in the same trial going to counts on which the defendant is acquitted").
111. See eg., United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1175 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223,1224 (9th Cir. 1973).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116, 1121 (7th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that
the trial court's consideration of defendant's acquittal on bank robbery charges was not used
to enhance the sentence it imposed for a criminal contempt charge); United States v. Mor-
gan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that consideration of prior acquittal may
have been considered a mitigating, rather than an aggravating factor); United States v.
Cardi, 519 F.2d 309,312-13 (7th Cir. 1975) (concluding that despite ambiguity in the record,
the sentencing court apparently had not relied on invalid convictions in sentencing).
113. 757 F.2d 1439 (4th Cir. 1985).
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without engaging in any independent legal analysis."' The court
merely noted that Sweig had been approved in every circuit where it
had been considered, and stated that it found Sweig "to be persua-
sive," therefore "adopt[ing] its reasoning as the law" of the Fourth
Circuit." Like most of the cases adopting Sweig, the Bernard court
did, however, allude to the broad discretion afforded sentencing
judges."6
This broad discretion possessed by sentencing judges influenced
acquitted conduct case law for practical reasons as much as for policy
reasons. Courts of the pre-Guidelines era recognized that, as a prac-
tical matter, it would have been extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible, to prevent sentencing judges from relying on acquitted
conduct and similar sources of information because of the absence of
a requirement that the judge explain the sentence."7 This undoubt-
edly contributed to the "let-it-all-in" philosophy characteristic of the
pre-Guidelines regime. In the words of one judge: "Reviewing
courts [prior to the Guidelines] believed that a judge inevitably
would be influenced by evidence he has heard already anyway. It
seemed a better practice not to reverse a judge so influenced for can-
didly disclosing the reasons for the sentence.'
This phenomenon was demonstrated in the related context of
unadjudicated conduct in United States v. Grayson,"9 in which the Su-
114. The facts in Bernard were quite similar to those in United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d
604 (3d Cir. 1989). See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (discussing holding in
Ryan). In Bernard, the defendant was charged with one count of possession with intent to
distribute marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). See 757 F.2d at 1442. The jury convicted him
of the lesser included offense of simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). See id. The
sentencing judge imposed the statutory maximum sentence of one year on the simple posses-
sion count, in the process indicating his view that the defendant had intended to distribute
the marijuana he was convicted of possessing. See id. at 1444.
115. See Bernard, 757 F.2d at 1444.
116. See id. ("Generally a sentence, if within the statutory limits, is not subject to re-
view."); see also Ray, 683 F.2d at 1120 (explaining that "[a] sentencing judge 'may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.'" (quoting United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,446 (1972))).
117. See, eg., United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41,55 n.1 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). In affirming a
sentence which was based, in part, on acquitted conduct, the court in Campbell explained:
"We should not adopt an unrealistic view of the sentencing process that can only deter trial
judges from articulating their reasons fully .... Judges ought not be reprimanded for ac-
knowledging the impact of the evidence presented during the trial unless the weighing in of
such evidence confounds a just result." Id
118. United States v. Boney, 977 F2d 624,645 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Randolph, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
119. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
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preme Court upheld a sentencing judge's reliance on an uncharged
perjury offense in sentencing a defendant guilty of escape from
prison.' Though it recognized the "impermissibility" of the practice
of "incarcerating for the purpose of saving the Government the bur-
den of bringing a separate and subsequent perjury prosecution,"' the
Court upheld the lower court's consideration of the truthfulness of
the defendant's testimony as part of the assessment of the defen-
dant's prospects for rehabilitation.m The Court emphasized not only
the need for maximum access to information for assessing rehabilita-
tion prospects, but the practical inability to control the use of such
considerations.m In the Court's own words, "[n]o rule of law, even
one garbed in constitutional terms, can prevent improper use of first-
hand observations of perjury."' 't The same limitations on appellate
review prevented Sweig-era courts from limiting the, use of acquitted
conduct evidence at sentencing.
In short, Sweig and its progeny offer little in the way of explicit
policy justifications favoring use of acquitted conduct in sentencing.' z
These cases instead reflect the structural limitations to appellate re-
view that no longer exist under the Guidelines scheme. Now that
sentencing judges are required to impose a sentence from within the
relatively narrow Guidelines range, or articulate permissible and
adequate reasons for departing from that range,m the time has come
to reevaluate the role of acquitted conduct in criminal sentencing. As
the next section demonstrates, however, constitutional challenges
through the courts are unlikely to provide a satisfactory mechanism
for reform.
B. The Rejection of Constitutional Challenges to Acquitted Conduct
under the Guidelines
Defendants have raised constitutional challenges to use of ac-
quitted conduct in Guidelines sentencing under both the Due Process
120. The sentencing judge, in a rare written opinion explaining his imposition of a two
year sentence, characterized the defendant's testimony in his own defense as a "complete
fabrication." See id. at 44.
121. Id. at 53.
122. See id. at 55.
123. See id. at 54.
124. Id.
125. Any policy justifications underlying the use of acquitted conduct that can be gleaned
from these cases reflect a then-prevailing model of indeterminate, rehabilitation-based sen-
tencing which was repudiated by the Sentencing Reform Act. See infra notes 239-42 and
accompanying text.
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
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and Double Jeopardy Clauses.' Taking their cue from the pre-
Guidelines acquitted conduct case law, as well as related Supreme
Court case law, federal appellate courts consistently have rejected
these claims.m
1. Acquitted Conduct and the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address directly the
constitutionality of sentence enhancement on the basis of acquitted
conduct. 29 Nevertheless, the Court's decisions in related areas
strongly support the current consensus of the United States courts of
appeals that such enhancement is constitutionally permissible."
Due process challenges to use of acquitted conduct in Guidelines
sentencing are effectively foreclosed by McMillan v. Pennsylvania."'
In McMillan, the Supreme Court upheld a provision in Pennsylva-
nia's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act (MMSA) which subjected
defendants convicted of certain enumerated felonies to a five-year
mandatory minimum sentence if the defendants were found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to have "visibly possessed a firearm"
during the commission of the offense.13
2
The defendants in McMillan mounted two due process chal-
lenges to the statute. First, they argued that the Pennsylvania
legislature, by relegating proof of firearm possession to sentencing,
and requiring proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence, vio-
lated the due process-based constitutional requirement that criminal
conduct be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' The Court rejected
this argument, characterizing as virtually absolute a legislature's dis-
cretion to determine what conduct is an essential element of the
offense and what conduct is merely a factor to be addressed at sen-
tencing.tm Under the Court's analysis, the MMSA did not violate the
"reasonable doubt" standard because the firearm enhancement was
127. See infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
129. The Court has denied certiorari on this issue on several occasions. See, e.g., United
States v. Billops, 43 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1389 (1995); United
States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (10th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 972 (1992).
130. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
131. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
132. See id. at 81.
133. See id, at 83. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of a criminal offense
was established as a constitutional requirement in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) and
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
134. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-90.
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possible only "after a defendant has been duly convicted of the crime
for which he is to be punished."'' 5 In other words, under the MMSA,
due process was satisfied by requiring the state to prove the defen-
dant's guilt of the underlying criminal behavior under the reasonable
doubt standard; the Court viewed the standard of proof needed to
establish additional facts relevant to sentencing as a different ques-
tion entirely.
6
The defendants' second due process challenge focused on this
latter issue-he argued that the use of the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard in resolving facts used in sentencing violates due
processY7  Citing Williams v. New York, the Court responded that
courts traditionally have made similar sentencing decisions without
any due process limitations on burdens of proof." In effect, the
McMillan Court reaffirmed the permissive approach to resolution of
sentencing facts embodied in Williams, extending that approach to
the context of determinate sentencing. 9  Together, Williams and
McMillan suggest that due process challenges to real-offense sen-
tencing are doomed to failure."'
The Court's jurisprudence suggests that double jeopardy chal-
lenges to the use of acquitted conduct evidence are also foreclosed.
In Dowling v. United States, 4' the Court held that testimony relating
to an alleged crime of which the defendant had previously been ac-
quitted could be introduced as "other crimes" evidence under Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 42 at a different trial. 43 The
135. Id. at 87.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 91.
138. See id. at 92.
139. See id. ("We have some difficulty fathoming why the due process calculus would
change simply because the legislature has seen fit to provide sentencing courts with addi-
tional guidance.").
140. See Reitz, supra note 6, at 546 ("Those who think that Williams will be relegated to
the dustbin along with reform-based [sentencing] theory have not, I think, been listening
carefully to the current Court."); Michael Tonry & John C. Coffee, Jr., Enforcing Sentencing
Guidelines: Plea Bargaining and Review Mechanisms, in THE SEN ENCING COMMISSION
AND ITs GuIDELINES 142, 152-63 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987) ("The broad thrust
of McMillan ... can give very little solace to those who look to the courts for constraints on
real-offense sentencing.").
141. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
142. Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" may be admit-
ted to prove, among other things, identity, but not "to prove the character of the person in
order to show action in conformity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
143. See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 344. Dowling was charged with robbing a Virgin Islands
bank while wearing a ski mask and carrying a small pistol. See id. at 344. The Government
attempted to introduce victim testimony identifying Dowling as the individual who, two
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Court rejected Dowling's contention that admission of this evidence
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause,1" relying primarily on the dif-
ferent standards of proof applicable to Dowling's first criminal trial
and to the basis for introduction of the other crimes evidence under
Rule 404(b).145 The Court further noted that its decision was
"consistent with other cases where [the Court] held that an acquittal
in a criminal case does not preclude the government from relitigating
an issue where it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a
lower standard of proof."'1"
Dowling suggests clearly that the use of acquitted conduct evi-
dence in a subsequent proceeding does not violate the constitutional
bar against double jeopardy, as long as the standard of proof applica-
ble in the second proceeding is less than the "reasonable doubt"
standard. 47 Because application of the preponderance standard to
sentencing decisions is now settled law,1" Dowling appears to pre-
weeks after the bank robbery, robbed her in her home while wearing a similar mask and
carrying a similar small handgun. See id. at 345. Dowling had, however, already been ac-
quitted of this latter robbery charge. See id.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ..... "). The Double Jeopardy Clause's protection of
defendants against multiple prosecutions for the same offense is grounded in the need to
protect citizens against the superior resources of the state, which may be brought to bear in
an abusive or overzealous manner. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130
(1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
145. See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348-49. The Court explained that because a jury might
reasonably conclude that Dowling was the masked man who entered the victim's home,
even if it did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Dowling committed the crimes
charged at the first trial, the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy
Clause was inapposite. See id
146. Id.; see, eg., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361-62
(1984) (holding that a gun owner's acquittal on criminal firearms charge did not preclude in
rem forfeiture proceeding against those firearms because the latter is governed by prepon-
derance standard).
147. Justice Brennan's dissent postulated that the Dowling rule could be extended to
permit use of acquitted conduct evidence. See id. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
Court's reasoning could apply even more broadly to justify the introduction of evidence of a
prior offense for which the defendant had been acquitted in order to enhance a defendant's
sentence."). Justice Brennan's prediction of Dowling's implications for acquitted conduct
has proved to be correct. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281,286 (7th Cir. 1992)
(citing Dowling in support of permitting sentence enhancement on the basis of acquitted
conduct).
148. The courts of appeals are unanimous in holding that the preponderance standard is
applicable in Guidelines sentencing proceedings. See United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d
563, 569 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 464 n.6 (8th Cir.
1990); United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330,1333 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Duncan,
918 F.2d 647,652 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1494-95 (11th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 1990), modified, 946 F.2d
654 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); United States v. Reynolds, 900 F.2d 1000,1003 (7th Cir. 1990);
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elude a successful double jeopardy challenge to the use of acquitted
conduct evidence in Guidelines sentence calculation. Moreover,
more recent decisions in related areas merely strengthen this view of
Dowling.
149
In short, although the Supreme Court has never addressed the
constitutionality of sentence enhancement on the basis of acquitted
conduct, related case law strongly suggests that constitutional chal-
lenges under both the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses
would be unsuccessful. The reasoning underlying these cases has
been instrumental in the appellate courts' virtually universal rejec-
tion of constitutional challenges to use of acquitted conduct.'
2. Guidelines Case Law
Due process challenges to the use of acquitted conduct under the
Guidelines have been doomed by the United States courts of appeals'
characterization of a jury's "not guilty" verdict merely as the gov-
ernment's failure to establish the charged conduct beyond a
reasonable doubt. Under McMillan,"' this failure does not bar an in-
consistent finding by the sentencing judge under the lower
preponderance standard."
United States v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907, 909 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d
862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247,250 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d
81,85 (4th Cir. 1989).
149. See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2204-07 (1995) (rejecting Double
Jeopardy Clause challenge to an indictment based on conduct previously used to enhance
defendant's sentence in a prior case); Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1925-28
(1994) (rebuffing a Sixth Amendment challenge to the use of a prior, uncounseled misde-
meanor offense as a basis for sentence enhancement, reasoning that this is analogous to
sentence enhancement based on conduct for which the defendant has not been convicted).
Witte, in particular, supports the conclusion that the Court would not view sentence en-
hancement based on acquitted conduct as a Double Jeopardy Clause violation. The Court
reasoned that sentence enhancement in prosecution 1 for conduct which also serves as the
basis for prosecution 2 is not a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because no jeopardy
attached in prosecution 1; the offender was not punished "for" the enhancement conduct in
prosecution 1, but rather "for" the offense of conviction in that case. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at
2205-07 (citing Williams v. Oklahoma, 368 U.S. 576 (1959) and Mel illan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79 (1986)). The analogy to the Guidelines is clear. Use of acquitted conduct does
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the punishment (for double jeopardy pur-
poses) is not "for" the acquitted conduct, but "for" the offense of conviction. See infra notes
153-54 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
151. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); see supra notes 131-40 and accompa-
nying text.
152. See e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("[It is well
established that 'due process is satisfied so long as facts necessary for sentencing are proved
by a preponderance of the evidence.' ") (quoting United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 869
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In addition, the acquitted conduct jurisprudence embraces the
notion that the defendant whose sentence is increased due to reliance
on acquitted conduct is not being punished for the conduct of which
he has been acquitted. Rather, the sentencing judge is imposing a
heavier sentence for the counts of conviction, based on facts found by
the court and deemed relevant to the defendant's culpability for sen-
tencing.' Under this view, as long as the punishment imposed is
within the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction, the de-
fendant's right to be free from double jeopardy has not been
infringed.L'
Some commentators have objected to the courts' extension of
the reasoning of pre-Guidelines cases to the Guidelines scheme, ar-
guing that the latter's finely graduated, fact-based determinate
sentencing has rendered use of acquitted conduct constitutionally un-
acceptable. 5  For the most part, the courts have not grappled with
this issue, simply adopting the reasoning of pre-Guidelines cases
without much discussion. Although the constitutional arguments of
(D.C. Cir. 1989)); United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244,254 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Because the
government need only establish facts for use in sentencing by a mere preponderance of the
evidence ... the sentencing court may rely on facts underlying an acquitted count if the pre-
ponderance standard is satisfied."); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 181-
82 (2d Cir. 1990) ("On the record before us, the district court could properly have found by a
preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant] possessed a firearm...."); United
States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1989) ("A verdict of acquittal demonstrates only a
lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not necessarily establish the defendant's
innocence.").
153. See, e.g., United States v. Talbott, 902 F.2d 1129, 1133 (4th Cir. 1990); Rodriguez-
Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 180-81; United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1989). The
Supreme Court has employed a somewhat similar analysis in upholding the constitutionality
of a Guidelines sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice, based on the defendant's
uncharged perjury. See Dunnigan v. United States, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993) (stating that sen-
tence enhancement based on perjury is "more than a mere surrogate for a perjury
prosecution," furthering "legitimate sentencing goals relating to the principal crime"
(emphasis added)). This reasoning also was employed in Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2204-07.
154. See Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 180 (citing United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d
181,184 (2d Cir. 1972)).
155. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 6, at 316-25 (arguing that Williams and McMillan are
of limited applicability to federal Guidelines sentencing); see also Heaney, supra note 7, at
215-20 (arguing that Williams and McMillan were based, in part, on the minor effects of
considering uncharged conduct, but that this is no longer true under the Guidelines); Kirch-
ner, supra note 6, at 816-18 (arguing that McMillan does not apply to Guidelines cases and
that the purpose of statutory maximums has changed with the Guidelines). Others have
taken a slightly different approach, arguing that the Williams/McMillan line of cases were
wrongly decided in the first place. See Lear, supra note 6, at 1218 ("The Supreme Court's
due process analysis must be reconsidered, not in response to the change in sentencing struc-
ture [caused by the Guidelines], but because the approach was wrong in the first instance.").
Regardless of their approaches, however, these commentators agree that sentence en-
hancement on the basis of acquitted conduct violates the Constitution.
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those commentators are powerful, this Article argues that seeking
changes through the political process is a more realistic means to ad-
dress the acquitted conduct problem. Advocates of the constitutional
infirmity of real-offense sentencing are unlikely soon to convince the
courts that the advent of the Guidelines renders unconstitutional the
use of acquitted conduct. Indeed, McMillan itself was decided in the
context of a determinate sentencing scheme, upholding the imposi-
tion of a mandatory minimum sentence enhancement triggered by a
preponderance-based sentencing finding."6 The Court's recent deci-
sions in Nichols and Witte, both of which involved challenges to
Guidelines sentences, further suggest the continuing vitality of
McMillan in the Guidelines era.'7 As a practical matter, opponents
of acquitted conduct at sentencing are well advised to seek a non-
judicial forum for their arguments.'
However, even if one concedes, for purposes of argument, that
the changes wrought by the Guidelines have not altered the constitu-
tional landscape of federal criminal sentencing, it cannot be denied
that those changes have been profound. Sentencing judges no longer
possess the virtually unfettered discretion to impose any sentence
within the broad range permitted by statute, for any reason and with-
out explanation."u Under the determinate Guidelines sentencing
scheme now in effect, a specific, identifiable quantum of punishment
is associated with each material factual finding made by the sentenc-
ing judge."O The parties have the right to appeal an improperly
calculated sentence, or a sentence that departs from the range speci-
fied by the Guidelines. 6' In short, under the Guidelines, there is a
heightened sensitivity to the interests of both the defendant and soci-
ety in the severity of the sentence imposed. The Guidelines also have
opened up the sentencing process, providing the opportunity to iden-
tify the specific factors used in sentencing, and evaluate whether use
156. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 149.
158. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. In effect, this Article adopts an agnostic
view of the merits of the constitutional arguments raised by Lear and other commentators,
accepting as an existing constraint current constitutional doctrine as it relates to permissibil-
ity of use of acquitted conduct. Under this view, the inquiry becomes whether a sound case
can be made on policy grounds for changing the current approach to use of acquitted con-
duct. This Article asserts that such a case can be made.
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (requiring sentencing judge to impose a sentence
from within the applicable Guidelines range in the absence of exceptional circumstances).
160. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of Guidelines
sentence calcuiation).
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b) (1994).
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of those factors is appropriate."
As the next section demonstrates, when the use of acquitted
conduct evidence is evaluated in light of the Guidelines, it becomes
clear that strong policy considerations militate against its continued
use in Guidelines sentencing.
III. THE CASE FOR COMMISSION ACTION TO ELIMINATE THE USE
OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT
The propriety of using acquitted conduct in Guidelines sentenc-
ing is not only a matter of constitutional law; it is also a matter of
policy. Judicial rejection of constitutional challenges to the use of
acquitted conduct does not preclude the Sentencing Commission
from examining the policy implications of using acquitted conduct in
Guidelines sentencing and amending the Guidelines in light of rele-
vant policy considerations. This section argues that permitting
Guidelines sentence enhancement on the basis of acquitted conduct
is inconsistent with important policies underlying our criminal justice
system, and that amendment of the Guidelines is an appropriate solu-
tion to the problems created by use of acquitted conduct.
A. The Guidelines' Use of Acquitted Conduct Is Bad Sentencing
Policy
Permitting sentencing judges to enhance sentences on the basis
of acquitted conduct does violence to important policies underlying
the criminal justice system. First, it undermines the defendant's fun-
damental interest in verdict finality, exposing the defendant to a
second mini-trial on conduct underlying the count of acquittal in con-
travention of principles underlying the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.'6 Second, it denigrates the role of the jury, diminish-
ing the jury's ability to function as a source of community
participation in the justice system, and possibly reducing the effec-
tiveness of the norm-reinforcing function of the criminal law."
162. See United States v. Quintero, 937 F.2d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 1991) ("For all the criticism
the guidelines have attracted, one of their virtues is the illumination of practices and policies
that were applicable in the pre-guidelines era, but that received less attention when sen-
tences were only a generalized aggregation of various factors, many of which were
frequently unarticulated.").
163. See infra notes 165-85 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
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1. Use of Acquitted Conduct Undermines Defendants' Interest in
Verdict Finality
It has long been settled that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against double jeopardy protects defendants against multiple prose-
cutions for the same offense-whether subsequent prosecution
follows acquittal or conviction.165 The protections offered by the
Double Jeopardy Clause reflect the need for some check on the supe-
rior resources of the State, which may be brought to bear in an
overzealous or abusive manner.' No aspect of the prohibition
against double jeopardy is more central than the rule against relitiga-
tion of charges following an acquittal."7 As the Supreme Court has
noted, "the law attaches particular significance to an acquittal."' ' In
fact, the Court has held consistently that acquittal is an absolute bar
to further prosecution,"' even if the acquittal is based on an
"egregiously erroneous foundation. '  This absolute double jeop-
ardy bar against relitigation of acquittal charges reflects "both an
institutional interest in preserving the finality of judgments, and a
strong public interest in protecting individuals against government
overreaching.""
A defendant's fundamental interest in the finality of his acquittal
is grounded as well in the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and
the jury's power of nullification implicit in that provision.Y Al-
though the right of the jury to decline to convict regardless of the
evidence has long been the subject of much debate,'3 its authority to
165. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds
by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
166. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,130 (1980).
167. The rule that a defendant may not be retried following an acquittal is said to be "the
most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence." United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,571 (1977).
168. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82,91 (1978).
169. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,355 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam); accord
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54,68-69 (1978).
171. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 n.11 (1980). Some commenta-
tors have linked the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to the double jeopardy provisions,
arguing that preservation of the jury's power to nullify is the principal rationale of the abso-
lute double jeopardy bar against relitigation of counts of acquittal. See Peter Westen &
Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. Cr. REV. 81,122-
55.
173. See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 60-64 (1895) (suggesting that
history offers no authority for a jury's right to disregard the judge's instructions on the appli-
cable law); see also Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification" The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 168,207-23 (1972) (discussing resistance of federal courts to instructions informing the
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do so is beyond dispute.74 The jury's power of nullification may be
traced back to the origins of the Bill of Rights, when the jury was
viewed as an essential impediment to the use of the criminal law as
an instrument of oppression. 5 The Sixth Amendment and the im-
plied power of nullification underlie the prohibition against directed
guilty verdicts and judgments of conviction notwithstanding a ver-
dict.' 6 The Sixth Amendment similarly prevents the taking of an
appeal from a verdict of not guilty."
Although the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing technically
may not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, '78 the important
and long-recognized policies underlying these amendments are
clearly undermined by permitting sentence enhancement under the
Guidelines 9 For example, the defendant's interests in finality of the
jury's verdict and freedom from governmental overreaching are sub-
verted by the use of acquitted conduct evidence. The government's
pursuit of sentence enhancement on the basis of conduct for which it
failed to obtain a conviction places the defendant's liberty at risk a
second time, just as would a successive trial. ' As in the case of a
successive trial, the defendant faced with a Guidelines sentencing
proceeding at which acquitted conduct is considered suffers the addi-
tional anxiety of being made once again to run the gauntlet. In effect,
the government, having failed to meet its burden of proof at trial, is
jury of its power to nullify); Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System." A
Skeptical View, 54 Tnx. L. REV. 488, 512-16 (1976) (discussing disadvantages of jury nullifi-
cation); Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 825, 829 (1990) ("The jury's power to nullify is a universally acknowledged,
though not a universally approved, part of our criminal procedure.").
174. See, ag., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (noting that even the
decision of a "lawless" decision-maker is not subject to review).
175. See SHANNON C. STiMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 34 (1990);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190-91 (1991).
176. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947); Sparf &
Hansen, 156 U.S. at 105-06.
177. See Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 570-71 (noting that the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits review of a verdict of acquittal).
178. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
179. Even cases rejecting constitutional challenges to the Guidelines' use of acquitted
conduct have acknowledged that the distinctions underlying their conclusions are quite tech-
nical and do not address the underlying fairness of the use of acquitted conduct. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177,181 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Of course, from the
point of view of a defendant receiving added prison time because of the presence of a gun,
the distinction [between a conviction, which triggers double jeopardy analysis, and a sen-
tence enhancement, which does not] may be academic.").
180. See supra note 144 (stating the Supreme Court's interpretation of the rationale for
the Double Jeopardy Clause).
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permitted a second bite at the apple, a chance to make its case before
an alternative decisionmaker, the sentencing judge.
Moreover, the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing arguably
entails even greater risk to the defendant's liberty interests than sub-
sequent prosecutions because the protections of the reasonable doubt
standard and the rules of evidence do not apply. 81 In addition, with
the dry run of the trial presentation completed, "the prosecution may
perfect" the presentation of its case and thus "gain an unfair advan-
tage in meeting its [lower] burden of proof in the second
proceeding."'' Viewed from a slightly different perspective, allowing
sentence enhancement for acquitted conduct is tantamount to per-
mitting the judge to enter, for sentencing purposes, a judgment of
guilt notwithstanding the verdict on the counts of acquittal, an action
which is barred as inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury." In each case, the judge is substituting her judgment of
the evidence on a count of conviction for that of the jury. As the
Ninth Circuit suggested in United States v. Brady,"M this weakens the
power of the jury as a check on prosecutorial overreaching and in-
creases the risk of an inappropriate deprivation of the defendant'sliberty."
2. The Guidelines' Use of Acquitted Conduct Undermines the
Symbolic Functions of Jury Participation in the Criminal Justice
System
Jury participation in the criminal justice system serves several
important values. One such value is to ensure the "substantive
181. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 6, at 351 (citing concerns about double jeopardy and
the defendant's "additional anxiety from being made to run the gauntlet a second time").
182. Id.; cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,447 (1970) ("In this case the State in its brief
has frankly conceded that following the petitioner's acquittal, it treated the first trial as no
more than a dry run for the second prosecution .... [T]his is precisely what the constitu-
tional guarantee [against double jeopardy] forbids.").
183. Moreover, as Professor Kevin Reitz has pointed out, even "if we were to abolish the
jury trial guarantee to allow judgments n.o.v. of guilt, we still presumably would require
judges to find that no reasonable jury" could acquit on the evidence presented, a standard
vastly different from the preponderance of evidence standard currently employed. See Re-
itz, supra note 6, at 551.
184. 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991).
185. See id. at 851-52. In the Brady court's words, "We would pervert our system of jus-
tice if we allowed a defendant to suffer punishment for a criminal charge for which he or she
was acquitted." Id. at 851; cf. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (explaining
that double jeopardy provisions are designed in part to protect against superior resources of
the state wearing down a defendant and "enhancing the possibility that even though inno-
cent he may be found guilty").
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criminal law's objective of only punishing those defendants who are
morally culpable in the community's eyes."1" This defendant-
protective function of jury participation is reflected in the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protections discussed in the previous section.'"
However, jury participation also serves important process values
that go beyond the interests of defendants. Jury participation serves
the dual purposes of reinforcing democratic norms by encouraging
citizen participation in administration of the criminal justice system,
and increasing public confidence in that system.' In addition, the
public jury trial promotes the criminal law's important moralizing
and educative functions, complementing the law's deterrent effectY
The criminal trial is more than a truth-seeking process concerned
with justice to the parties; "it is also a drama that the public attends
and from which it assimilates behavioral messages."1" In other
words, the substantive legal norms that shape social behavior are de-
rived, in part, from the judicial process."'
186. Peter Aranelia, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' CompetingIdeologies, 72 GEo. LU. 185,216 (1983).
187. See supra notes 165-85 and accompanying text.
188. The Court has long recognized the importance of the jury in ensuring the commu-
nity participation in the criminal justice system that is crucial to public confidence in that
system. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,530-31 (1975) ("[S]haring in the admini-
stration of justice [through jury service] is a phase of civic responsibility."); id. at 530
("Community participation in the administration of the criminal law [is] consistent with our
democratic heritage [and is] critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system.").
189. The moralizing function of the criminal law has been cited as a crucial component of
the deterrence that the criminal law is designed to promote. See, e.g., Johannes Andenaes,
General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 176, 179 (1952)
("The idea is that punishment as a concrete expression of a society's disapproval of an act
helps us to form and to strengthen the public's moral code .... ").
190. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability
of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357,1360 (1985).
191. Professor Nesson acknowledges that effective general deterrence depends on the
public's acceptance of the verdict as a statement about the litigated events. See id. at 1360-
61. He suggests that such acceptance is facilitated in the context of criminal trials by the
secrecy of the jury's deliberations and the use of general verdicts. See id. at 1365 ("[T]he
general public will rarely learn whether the jury regarded its judgment as a statement about
the evidence or a statement about the event."). This precondition to the use of the litigation
process to advance the moralizing function of the law may well be significantly weakened in
an era in which jurors from the OJ. Simpson case publish books about the trial and make
appearances on the Today Show to justify their verdict. Even a brief perusal of the volumi-
nous OJ.-related media analysis suggests that the general public is being exposed to an ever
greater extent to the notion of the "reasonable doubt" standard, and the possible divergence
between a jury verdict and the "true" facts underlying the litigated events. See, e.g., James
M. Kramon, O.J.'s Jury Did the Right Thing, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 3, 1995, at 1J. To the
extent that Court TV and other forums publicize evidence presented at trials, permitting the
viewing public to attempt to judge the evidence independently, members of the public are
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The use of acquitted conduct in sentencing undermines each of
these important interests. First, sentence enhancement on the basis
of acquitted conduct, in effect, tells the jury (and the public in gen-
eral) that the jury's efforts in assessing the evidence and weighing the
different charges were of limited importance, overridden by the con-
trary opinion of one judge. This inevitably detracts from the jury's
ability to function as a conduit for community conscience in culpabil-
ity assessment, diminishing the democratic nature of the criminal
justice system, and driving a wedge between the community's sense
of appropriate punishment and the criminal sanction actually in-
flicted. Such a divergence disserves important goals of the criminal
justice system.1" In addition, use of acquitted conduct undermines
the civic value of participation in the jury trial process, as well as the
public confidence in the system that such participation fosters.193 The
message that a defendant may permissibly be punished for conduct
for which a jury found him not guilty is so counterintuitive to ordi-
nary citizens, that it cannot help but have a negative impact on public
confidence in the criminal justice system.94
In addition, the burden of proof-based rationalization for per-
mitting sentence enhancement on the basis of acquitted conduct95 is
inconsistent with the norm-reinforcing goals of traditional criminal
law. Professor Nesson suggests that these substantive legal norms are
not assimilated properly unless the public views verdicts as state-
ments about what actually happened, rather than merely as a
statement about the proof rule.96 He explains:
Courts use the ambiguity of the [general] jury verdict
to project the verdict as a statement about what hap-
pened. Regardless of the thought processes by'which
jurors arrive at their verdicts, judges in both criminal
and civil cases treat jury verdicts as statements about
more likely to draw their own conclusions about the litigated events, robbing the jury verdict
of some of its lesson-inculcating authority. See Gail Diane Cox, Lights! Camera! Justice?
NAT'L LJ., Jan. 29, 1996, at 1, 21 (speculating that acquittals may mean less when viewing
public has opportunity to view the evidence in televised cases). Nevertheless, it may be
premature to abandon completely the role of the impaneled jury as fact finder, even in the
court of public opinion.
192. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
194. See FRANCIS ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECr, AND EDUCATION 105 (1979) ("Any oper-
ating system of law ... requires the articulation of principles that are ... comprehensible [to
persons subject to the law] not only in the sense of being capable of rational application, but
also of appealing to almost instinctual feelings of fitness and propriety.").
195. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
196. See Nesson, supra note 190, at 1361.
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the litigated events. This institutional acceptance of
the verdict justifies the imposition of a sanction on the
defendant and furthers the inculcation of the applica-
ble legal rule.1
To the extent Nesson is correct about this assimilation process,
198
it may be undermined by the law's current approach to treatment of
acquitted conduct. Permitting the judge to, in effect, ignore the jury's
verdict and impose punishment on the basis of acquitted conduct is
inconsistent with a treatment of the jury's finding as a surrogate for
discoverable truth. It highlights both the inconclusiveness of the
jury's verdict as a statement about the events underlying the prosecu-
tion, and the technical distinction between the standards of proof
applicable at trial and at sentencing. This approach risks undermin-
ing the projection of the substantive norms of the criminal law to the
general public. In any event, it clearly casts doubt on the legitimacy
of the sentences imposed.
B. The Commission Is the Proper Forum for Addressing Use of
Acquitted Conduct Evidence
If the conclusions of the preceding section of this Article are cor-
rect, the question becomes, what is to be done about it? Although
both Congress and the federal courts clearly have the authority to
redress the problems caused by use of acquitted conduct, the Com-
mission is best suited to adopt necessary reforms. The Commission
was specifically designed to monitor Guidelines application and
promulgate amendments to address policy concerns. " Moreover,
neither Congress nor the courts have shown any inclination to recon-
sider the current approach to use of acquitted conduct.o
The Commission's authority to bar consideration of acquitted
conduct is beyond serious dispute. Congress delegated to the Com-
mission substantial authority to structure the sentencing discretion of
judges, including the authority to restrict judges' reliance on many of
the offender characteristics traditionally used in sentencing."' Fun-
197. Id. at 1366.
198. But see supra note 191 (pointing out some problems with Nesson's analysis).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1994) (providing that the Commission "periodically shall
review and revise, in consideration of comments and data coming to its attention, the guide-
lines promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section").
200. See supra notes 129 and accompanying text (citing the Supreme Court's denials of
certiorari to cases in which sentences were enhanced on the basis of acquitted conduct); infra
note 207.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991) (discarding
"facts that have been rejected by a jury's not guilty verdict"). Thus, the Commission has
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damental sentencing policy choices, such as the decision to use a
modified real-offense model of sentencing, were delegated to the
Commission.m The Commission could have adopted an offense-of-
conviction sentencing model, effectively barring consideration of ac-
quitted conduct in the same way that it has barred or restricted
consideration of certain offender characteristics." The Commission
clearly has the power to bar consideration of acquitted conduct under
the modified real-offense model as well.
The Commission's authority to bar use of acquitted conduct is
the best hope for immediate change, given the dearth of practical al-
ternatives to Guideline amendment. The federal appellate courts are
essentially unanimous in rejecting constitutional challenges to acquit-
ted conduct evidence," and the Supreme Court has given no
indication of any intention to weigh in on this issue. °5 Moreover,
several of the Court's rulings are hostile to such challenges, and the
Court does not appear likely to overrule these cases in the near fu-
ture. 2
6
Congress is an equally unlikely forum for change. The politically
inspired need to appear tough on crime, the press of other legislative
matters, and the relative obscurity of this issue combine to render it
an unlikely candidate for legislative attention in the near future.'
The appropriateness of the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing
seems precisely the type of issue Congress empowered the Commis-
restricted consideration of such factors as the defendant's youth (§ 5111.1), drug or alcohol
abuse (§ 5H1.4), past military service (§ 5H1.1), and prior arrest record (§ 4A1.3).
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994) (setting out in detail the duties of the Commission, but
failing to specify whether the Guidelines should be based on the offense of conviction, real-
offense factors or some other model).
203. See id.; see also Lear, supra note 6, at 1192-93 (decrying use of "real-offense" system
as expansive).
204. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing cases where federal appellate courts
have rejected constitutional challenges to acquitted conduct evidence). The Ninth Circuit's
decision in Brady is not to the contrary. The court eschewed a constitutionally based ration-
ale for its holding, basing it instead on a combination of policy concerns and Guidelines
interpretation. See 928 F.2d at 852 n.14 (declining to address Brady's constitutional argu-
ments because the court "decide[d] this issue on statutory grounds").
205. Indeed, the Court has exhibited some hesitancy in resolving circuit conflicts in
Guidelines interpretation, leaving such resolution to the Commission in most cases. See
Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344,348-49 (1991) (suggesting that Commission's author-
ity to revise the Guidelines reduces the need for the Court to resolve conflicts).
206. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
207. See generally Don Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused, 44
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1079 (1993) (using public choice theory to explain why legislative bodies
are generally unwilling or unable to enact provisions protecting the rights of criminal defen-
dants).
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sion to address. The Commission should do so.
Finally, Commission action to bar the use of acquitted conduct
as a basis for sentence enhancement would further the Commission's
statutory mission to reduce unwarranted disparity by eliminating the
long-standing split over the permissibility of using acquitted conduct
between the courts of the Ninth Circuit and those of every other cir-
cuit."5 Currently, similarly situated defendants are treated differently
solely on the basis of geographic location, a situation at odds with
Congress's intent in creating the Commission." Moreover, there is
little solace in the fact that only one circuit is in the minority on this
issue, given that the Ninth Circuit accounts for more than one of six
defendants sentenced under the Guidelines. ° Congress explicitly
delegated to the Commission the "duty to review and revise the
Guidelines" to avoid such inter-circuit variation in sentencing prac-
tices.
21
It is appropriate to note here that the Commission's previous
rejection of Guidelines amendments designed to curtail use of acquit-
ted conduct imposes no institutional constraint on future action. The
Commission has reconsidered its positions on numerous issues, often
passing amendments similar to those previously rejected. 2 Moreo-
ver, with President Clinton's appointment of four Commissioners, the
208. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the inter-circuit split in
itself is not a justification for barring use of acquitted conduct. The Supreme Court could
resolve the split by overruling the Ninth Circuit case law, alternatively, the Commission
could resolve the split by clarifying the Guidelines to authorize specifically the use of acquit-
ted conduct. However, in light of the policy arguments against the use of acquitted conduct,
the proposal offered in the following pages reflects the best resolution of the current split.
209. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41-46 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,3224-
29 (criticizing disparity created when similarly situated defendants in different circuits or
districts receive disparate sentences). Although similar disparities may result from any of
the myriad circuit splits in Guidelines interpretation, this disparity seems especially perni-
cious because of the fundamental nature of the question involved. See supra notes 163-98
and accompanying text.
210. In Fiscal Year 1994, districts within the Ninth Circuit accounted for 18.6% of dispo-
sitions under the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCiNG COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1994
[hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL REPORT], at 50 tbl. 18 (listing 7,427 Ninth Circuit dispositions
and 39,896 total dispositions).
211. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344,348-49 (1991).
212. For example, the 1993 amendments to the money laundering guidelines were similar
to a set of amendments proposed, but not adopted, in the previous amendment cycle. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 490 (1995). Similarly, in 1993 the
Commission amended the notes to section 2D1.1 to provide a minor window for downward
departure when drug quantities involved in an offense result in a sentence which overstates
the defendant's culpability. See i4 app. C, amend. 485. In earlier years, the Commission had




membership of the Commission has changed dramatically since 1993,
providing an excellent opportunity for reexamination of the acquitted
conduct issue.2"
IV. THE COMMISSION SHOULD AMEND THE GUIDELINES TO
PROHIBIr SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT ON THE BASIS OF ACQUITTED
CONDUCT
In order to address the distortions and inequities caused by the
use of acquitted conduct to enhance offenders' sentences, the Sen-
tencing Commission should amend the Guidelines and accompanying
Commentary to specify that sentence enhancement on the basis of
acquitted conduct is impermissible. The following sections contain
some proposed language, the principal anticipated objections to the
proposal, and responses to these objections.
A. The Proposal
The precise form of an amendment to bar acquitted conduct in
Guidelines sentencing is less important than its clarity and scope of
coverage. The amendment should ensure that conduct for which the
defendant has been acquitted may not, under any circumstances, be
counted as relevant conduct under the Guidelines, nor be used as a
basis for upward departure. The Commission also should consider
amending the language of certain specific offense characteristic en-
hancements to eliminate possible disputes regarding the scope of
acquittals and to ensure consistent application of the new ban on use
of acquitted conduct. An application note addressing the scope of
the preclusive effect of verdicts, and possibly some illustrations of the
effect of the amendment, might also be helpful.
The proposed amendment to the relevant conduct provisions
might look something like this:
§ 1B1.3 Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the
Guideline Range)
(c) Conduct of which the defendant has been acquitted
shall not be considered under this section.
Commentary
Application Notes:
213. No formal proposal to address acquitted conduct was considered by the Commission
in the 1994-95 amendment cycle.
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11. Subsection (c) provides that conduct of which the de-
fendant has been acquitted shall not be considered in
determining the offense level under this section. Note,
however, that a verdict of acquittal will not, in itself, fore-
close in every case application of a Guidelines provision that
is based upon conduct similar to the conduct involved in a
count of which the defendant was acquitted. It is the intent
of this subsection to preclude the court from reconsidering
at sentencing only those facts that the court determines
must have been resolved in the defendant's favor in an ac-
quittal, the defendant having the burden of persuasion as
the proponent of exclusion.
The Commission also should amend the language of section
5K2.02 14 to specify that acquitted conduct cannot be a basis for depar-
ture. This amendment could consist of the following sentence, to be
added to the end of the first paragraph of the policy statement:
§ 5K2.0 Grounds for Departure (Policy Statement)
The court may not, however, depart on the basis of conduct
of which the defendant has been acquitted.
Finally, the Commission will need to consider the effect of the
language of certain offense characteristics which differs subtly from
that of a corresponding offense. The most notable example is section
2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for an enhancement to a drug trafficking
sentence "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was pos-
sessed.,2" This language and the accompanying commentary, which
specifies that the enhancement should be applied "if the weapon was
present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected
with the offense, '21 6 arguably cover a slightly broader range of con-
duct than the corresponding statutory provision. Section
214. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
215. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b) (1995).
216. Id § 2D1.1, application note 3 (emphasis added).
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994) (enhancing punishment for the defendant who "uses or
carries" a firearm "in relation to" a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence); see also
Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 505 (1995) (holding that "use" of firearm requires
some sort of active employment of the firearm by the defendant; presence of the weapon
alone is not a violation of § 924(c)).
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2D1.1(b)(1) and similar provisions should be modified to ensure an
identity between the Guidelines enhancement and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
its corresponding statutory provision. Failure to do so, or otherwise
to specify that acquittal on a § 924(c) charge prohibits imposition of a
firearm enhancement, could lead to disputes about the scope of the
jury's acquittal and might diminish the effectiveness of the proposal
by permitting judges in some cases to impose the enhancement for
presence of the weapon despite the jury's acquittal.
The proposal advocated in this Article is somewhat broader than
the proposed amendments rejected in April 1993 and 1994.21 In con-
trast to those proposed amendments, this proposal is not limited to
prohibiting use of acquitted conduct as relevant conduct in calculat-
ing the applicable Guidelines offense level, but expressly prohibits
acquittal-based upward departure as well. In addition, this proposal
alters the standards for applying the firearms enhancement to make it
consonant with § 924(c). These steps are necessary to fully effectuate
the policies outlined in Part III(A) of this Article.219
B. Objections to the Proposal and Responses
The Department of Justice (DOJ) opposed, and in April 1993
the Commission rejected, proposed amendments to limit the use of
acquitted conduct under the Guidelines' relevant conduct provi-
sions.' This section outlines the principal objections articulated by
DOJ and the Commissioners and attempts to demonstrate that they
are insufficiently weighty to justify retaining existing rules on the use
of acquitted conduct."'
218. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
219. As explained above, some modification of the language of current weapons en-
hancements is necessary to ensure the full collateral estoppel effect of acquittals. See supra
notes 215-17 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of a case in which
permitting an acquittal-based upward departure would not violate the interests in acquittal
finality and integrity of jury verdicts outlined in Part HI(A).
220. DOJ's opposition was outlined in the Statement of Roger A. Pauley, Ex Officio
Member to the U.S. Sentencing Commission 3-7 (Mar. 22, 1993) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Pauley Statement]. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing Com-
mission's rejection of proposed acquitted conduct amendments).
221. This Article addresses these objections not as a criticism of DOJ or the Commis-
sioners, but because these objections constitute the most complete publicly articulated
defense of the use of acquitted conduct. As explained earlier, the courts upholding the con-
stitutionality of use of such evidence did not articulate an affirmative policy rationale for its
use. In addition, there is little academic defense of use of acquitted conduct evidence. But
see Webber, supra note 6, at 468-73 (defending use of acquitted conduct).
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1. The Slippery Slope to Abolition of Relevant Conduct
One possible objection to any proposal to bar use of acquitted
conduct is that it is not sufficiently distinguishable from unadjudi-
cated conduct to warrant special treatment. In other words, why
prohibit sentencing judges from enhancing sentences on the basis of
acquitted conduct when they can enhance sentences on the basis of
the same conduct if it is not charged by the prosecutor? This con-
cern seemed to cause some Commissioners to view adoption of the
proposed acquitted conduct amendments as the first step down a
slippery slope toward inevitable abolition of relevant conduct in fa-
vor of an offense-of-conviction system of punishment.m In my view,
this perceived link between acquitted conduct and all unadjudicated
conduct was central to the Commission's rejection of the proposed
amendments." ' Unless a reasonable argument can be made that
there is a principled distinction between acquitted conduct and un-
adjudicated conduct, it will be difficult to muster the votes on the
Commission to adopt the proposal; the unfairness of use of acquitted
conduct in a limited number of cases will be viewed as insufficient to
warrant significant modification of the current system.'
It is understandable that some Commissioners perceived a link
between acquitted conduct and unadjudicated relevant conduct. In
each case, the defendant receives a higher sentence than otherwise
would be imposed, on the basis of conduct for which he was never
convicted. Moreover, the ABA Criminal Justice Section, which sup-
ported the proposed acquitted conduct amendments, linked them
together in urging the Commission to substitute a "conviction of-
fense" approach,' thereby highlighting the similarities between
acquitted conduct and unadjudicated relevant conduct. 6 Neverthe-
222. Both Chairman Wildns and Commissioner Carnes raised this issue during the April
6th meeting. See 1993 Commission Meeting, supra note 10.
223. I have no documentary evidence of this. However, the general tenor of the Com-
mission's debate over acquitted conduct suggests that this concern underlay much of the
opposition to the proposed amendment.
224. Recall that the former Chairman of the Commission and its General Counsel re-
ferred to the modified real-offense sentencing policies reflected in the relevant conduct
provisions as the "cornerstone" of the Guidelines scheme. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note
33, at 495-96. Abandonment of this approach in favor of a pure conviction offense sentenc-
ing scheme would require a major overhaul of the entire Guidelines system, a "revolution"
in Guidelines sentencing that the Commission understandably would be reluctant to under-
take.
225. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (documenting the Commission's con-
sideration of a "charge offense" system, under which the sentence is based exclusively on the
offense for which the defendant is charged and convicted).
226. See Statement of Steven Salky, Chairman, American Bar Association Section on
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less, a principled distinction can be made between acquitted conduct
and unadjudicated conduct, and the Commission could rationally
draw the line at use of acquitted conduct.
First, the Commission should recognize that acquittal, as a for-
mal exoneration of criminal culpability, is simply unique. Use of
acquitted conduct differs from use of unadjudicated conduct in that
the former represents repudiation of a formal, legally conclusive con-
firmation of the accused's legal innocence of the adjudicated
charges.m Because the jury's verdict represents a formal certification
of the defendant's legal innocence, its finality is perceived as a fun-
damental principle of fairness. As one court explained, "the
acquitted defendant is to be treated as innocent and in the interests
of fairness and finality made no more to answer for his alleged
crime." s
The special significance of acquittals is further exemplified by
the oft-stated desire of criminal suspects to receive a trial in order to
achieve exoneration. Typical is a 1993 news story about a male uni-
versity student who, after being investigated by university
disciplinary authorities for an alleged sexual assault, went to the
police and demanded that he be charged with rape so he could clear
his name.'
Several state courts have recognized the elevated status of ac-
quittal in the context of sentencing, holding that acquitted conduct,
unlike unadjudicated conduct, may not be used in sentencing.' This
Criminal Justice, Committee on the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 10 (Mar. 15,
1993) (on file with author). It stated:
We endorse this amendment because it is consistent with the Third Edition of
the ABA Standards for Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures [which] pro-
vides that the severity of sentences imposed and the types of sanctions imposed
should be determined with reference to offense(s) of conviction and not upon
the so-called "real offense."
Id.
227. Indeed, Black's Law Dictionary defines an acquittal as the "legal and formal certifi-
cation of the innocence of a person who has been charged with crime." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 24 (6th ed. 1990). Of course, it is widely recognized that "legal" innocence and
"factual" innocence are not the same. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LnMTS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968) (discussing the distinction); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652,707 (1981) (same).
228. State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307,308 (Minn. 1979); see also McNew v. State, 391
N.E.2d 607, 612 (Ind. 1979) ("A not guilty judgment is more than a presumption of inno-
cence; it is a finding of innocence and the courts of this state, including this Court, must give
exonerative effect to a not guilty verdict if anyone is to respect and honor the judgments
coming out of our criminal justice system.").
229. See Eugene Robinson, Date Rape in the Kingdom of Victoria, WASH. POST, Nov. 3,
1993, at C12-13.
230. See eg., In re Llewallen, 590 P.2d 383, 388 n.3 (Cal. 1979); McNew, 391 N.E2d at
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view of the nature of acquittal is more consistent with both public
perception of the meaning of acquittal, and the usual institutional
treatment of verdicts as statements about the litigated events,231 than
is the case law describing acquittal as mere absence of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt2 2 The bottom line is that acquittal carries a mes-
sage about the defendant's legal innocence that mere absence of a
conviction does not. The public's expectations about acquittal and
the policies outlined in Part III(A) are implicated by use of acquitted
conduct in a way in which they are not by use of unadjudicated con-
duct. Differential treatment of acquitted conduct is appropriate on
this basis alone.
In addition, practical problems are associated with eliminating,
from consideration all unadjudicated conduct-problems which this
Article's acquitted conduct proposal does not create. First, barring
use of acquitted conduct is much less likely than a broader ban on use
of unadjudicated conduct to increase the risk of sentencing disparity
through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Both Congress and
the Commission were concerned that charge bargaining could un-
dermine the goals of the Guidelines system by creating disparity
between similarly situated defendants. 3 The Commission's adoption
of the modified real-offense sentencing approach embodied in the
relevant conduct provisions was designed to limit the impact of
prosecutorial discretion on sentencing outcomesY2 The effectiveness
612; State v. Cote, 530 A.2d 775,783-85 (N.H. 1987); State v. Marley, 364 S.E.2d 133, 138-39
(N.C. 1988).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
232. Professor Albert Alschuler articulated a similar view in the slightly different context
of exploring public discomfort with the plea bargaining system, noting:
The compromise of a criminal case suggests that a defendant can be half-guilty
and can properly receive half the penalty that he would receive if he were really
guilty. Most people probably adhere to the simpler view that the defendant ei-
ther committed the crime or did not. If he did, he deserves the penalty that an
honest-to-God criminal should receive. If he did not (or, more accurately, if his
guilt cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt), he should not be punished at
all. If the criminal law is to serve its purposes, it may be well that most folks-in-
the-street adhere to this moralistic view of punishment, rather than to the alter-
native view that guilt is relative ....
Alschuler, supra note 227, at 706.
233. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical
Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 501, 505 (1992) [hereinafter Nagel & Schulhofer, Charging and Bargaining
Practices]; Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 235-52 (1989)
[hereinafter Schulhofer & Nagel, Negotiated Pleas].
234. See Lear, supra note 6, at 1204-05; see also supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text
(discussing the Commission's actions).
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of this approach in restraining widespread charge bargaining and re-
sulting disparities is subject to dispute, and is beyond the scope of this
Article.25 Nevertheless, a substantial risk exists that complete aban-
donment of real-offense sentencing would create a direct link
between the prosecutor's charging decision and the Guidelines sen-
tence, a link the Commission tried to avoid by adopting its modified
real-offense system. Such concerns simply are not implicated by lim-
iting reform to elimination of use of acquitted conduct.
Second, elimination of all unadjudicated conduct from sentenc-
ing consideration would result in unwarranted sentencing parity. All
persons convicted of, for example, drug trafficking are not equally
culpable. Some are leaders or organizers, others are mere couriers;
some traffic in large quantities, others do not; some pose an added
threat to the community from violence, others do not. Unless these
culpability factors are written into the statute as elements for offense
grading purposes (which, for most federal offenses, they are not),
they are not elements of the offense of conviction, and could not be
taken into account in a pure conviction offense sentencing scheme.
This would reduce the ability of judges to make the graduated culpa-
bility assessments necessary to a rational sentencing scheme."ss
2. Departure from Traditional Practice
Another objection, articulated by DOJ and each of the Commis-
sioners voting to reject the 1993 amendment, is that eliminating use
of acquitted conduct is a major departure from the long-settled past
practice of sentencing judgesn 7 One Commissioner characterized
such a change as undoing two hundred years of jurisprudence."s
This objection is not well founded. Merely because the courts
have long viewed the use of acquitted conduct as constitutionally
235. Some argue that relevant conduct increases the power of prosecutors. See, e.g.,
Freed, supra note 5, at 1714; Heaney, supra note 7, at 774.
236. See, eg., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-
mises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 9 (1988). As now-Justice Breyer
explained: "A bank robber, for example, might, or might not, use a gun; he might take a
little, or a lot, of money; he might, or might not, injure the teller. The typical armed robbery
statute, however, does not distinguish among these different ways of committing the crime."
Id
237. See, e.g., Pauley Statement, supra note 220, at 4 (arguing that the proposed amend-
ment would "constitute a dramatic departure from the constitutional standards courts have
historically applied to both pre-guideline and guidelines cases and would reverse a long line
of well-settled appellate decisions which permit judges to rely on [acquitted conduct] evi-
dence").
238. See 1993 Commission Meeting, supra note 10, at 3 (Statement of Commissioner
Julie E. Carnes).
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permissible does not mean that it is sound sentencing policy. If
changing circumstances have rendered past practice inappropriate,
that past practice should be changed. The Guidelines have altered
the sentencing process in a manner and to an extent requiring recon-
sideration of past practice on use of acquitted conduct. The use of
acquitted conduct proliferated in the context of a rehabilitative sys-
tem, in which judicial discretion was nearly unbridled, and a premium
was placed on availability of the greatest possible range of informa-
tion for use in fashioning a sentence to fit the offender. 9 Congress
clearly rejected the rehabilitative model of sentencing in adopting the
SRA,' substituting a system emphasizing the dual goals of propor-
tionate punishment and crime control through deterrence and
incapacitation. Under the Guidelines system, a discrete and identifi-
able quantum of punishment associated with specific findings is
present, made on the record, and subject to appellate review."I Thus,
the Guidelines system has eliminated many of the practical difficul-
ties in controlling sentencing judges' use of acquitted conduct
associated with pre-Guidelines practice.4 Both the defendant and
the appellate court can clearly determine when a sentence has been
enhanced on the basis of acquitted conduct. Therefore, its use can
now be identified and eliminated.
3. Inconsistent or Irrational Verdicts
Another possible objection to this proposal is that it would give
effect to verdicts that are inconsistent, mistaken, or even irrational.243
Clearly, juries reach verdicts in some cases that may strike observers,
including the presiding judge, as incorrect. However, our system of
criminal justice requires that we live with such verdicts. 2 The invio-
lability of "not guilty" verdicts, even those embodying outright
nullification, serves important interests. The jury acts as a restraining
influence on governmental authority by acting as a check on
overzealous prosecution and arbitrary judicial decisionmaking.245 The
239. See supra notes 90-126 and accompanying text.
240. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 3182, 3221 ("In
the Federal system today, criminal sentencing is based largely on an outmoded rehabilitation
model.... [A]lmost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that reha-
bilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting ....
241. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
243. See, eg., 1993 Commission Meeting, supra note 10 (Statement of Commissioner
Julie E. Carnes).
244. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (discussing jury nullification).
245. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (describing the jury as an
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jury also represents both the actual and symbolic participation of citi-
zens in the criminal justice system, a participation central to the
legitimacy of that system.24
The difficulties inherent in this "bad verdicts" objection are ap-
parent by looking at the sentencing court's analysis in United States v.
Juarez-Ortega,'7 a case in which the Fifth Circuit upheld a sentence
enhancement despite an acquittal for violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c).' The Fifth Circuit's decision contains an excerpt of the
sentencing transcript which reveals that the sentencing judge simply
disagreed with the jury's not guilty verdict:
THE COURT: The jury could not have made-the jury
could not have listened to the instructions.
[COUNSEL]: Your Honor,-
THE COURT: The testimony was so strong. The gun was
even in the apartment. That's all they needed. There was
no dispute of that fact. The mere fact that the gun was in
the apartment, being used in association with-he didn't
have to have it on his person.
[COUNSEL]: They perhaps didn't believe it was being used
in association with drug-related activity, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you something: I have been
disappointed in jury verdicts before, but that's one of the
most important ones, because what it did, it set up a dispar-
ity in result between the two defendants. Your client was
consistently selling cocaine from his apartment and using a
firearm. The fact is that the officers came in and testified
that it was in your client's waistband and described, had an
officer on the stand, a man who is an ATF agent, who is ca-
pable and knows what a firearm looks like, telling them,
"This is what I saw."
There is no reason for him not to have seen that, since it's
undisputed that the firearm was in the apartment, and it's
undisputed that the firearm was used in connection with
drug sales and used [for] the purpose of protecting drug
sales. And then here in number twelve, there is no doubt at
all that the firearm was brought for him. It's all a pattern.
This firearm was used. They had to absolutely disregard the
testimony of a government agent for no reason-no reason.
"inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the com-
pliant, biased, or eccentric judge").
246. See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
247. 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
248. See id. at 749.
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[COUNSEL]: Perhaps they considered the testimony of the
other agent who testified that he couldn't be sure, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Well, you can take it up with an appellate
court, because I've made my findings on the record.'
From the record reproduced in the appellate opinion, it is diffi-
cult to say whose view of the facts is "correct"-the judge's or the
jury's. The Fifth Circuit's affirmance was based on its conclusion that
the sentencing judge did not abuse his discretion.' What is clear,
however, is the fact that the jury trial is designed to achieve an as-
sessment of legal culpability in the face of factual uncertainty. The
reader of the Juarez-Ortega opinion cannot know whether the defen-
dant "really" possessed a weapon in connection with drug trafficking.
Society, through the mechanism of the jury trial, attempts to make a
considered judgment on the basis of the evidence that is available.
The jury is the body assigned the task of assessing legal responsibility,
which triggers the authority of the state to impose punishment. The
ease and assurance with which the sentencing judge in Juarez-Ortega
cast aside the jury's finding of no legal guilt is cause for no small
amount of discomfort.' Had the weapons charge in Juarez-Ortega
been the only charge before the jury, its verdict would have been
conclusive." z What is the rationale for disregarding the jury's verdict
where the defendant is adjudged guilty of related charges? The pos-
sibility of jury "error" provides no stronger justification for
disregarding a verdict in the latter situation than in the former. In-
deed, an "erroneous" acquittal in a one-count case permits the
defendant to go free, while an erroneous partial acquittal would
merely result in a reduced sentence under the proposal advanced in
this Article.
In effect, the "bad verdict" objection represents an implicit con-
clusion that achievement of a "correct" sentencing outcome
outweighs the process values represented by the jury system. This
conclusion diminishes the value of the jury as a check on government
power and as a source of community participation in the criminal jus-
249. Id. at 748-49.
250. See id. at 749.
251. See Alschuler, supra note 227, at 708. Professor Alschuler explains: "A prosecutor
or other observer who asserts that a defendant is 'factually' guilty although this defendant
might not be convicted at trial simply presumes his own superiority as a fact finder to the
body that has been authorized by law to make this determination." Id at 708-09.
252. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
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tice process.5 3 It is not a persuasive ground for permitting the con-
tinued use of acquitted conduct in sentencing.
4. Effect on Charging and Plea Practices
Another objection raised by DOJ in opposing the 1993 amend-
ments is the potential impact on prosecutorial charging practices and
in defendants' plea practices.-4 This argument has two prongs. First,
DOJ argues that defendants who currently plead guilty when faced
with several counts of similar offenses would have the incentive to go
to trial in an effort to defeat one or more of these multiple counts."
This would increase the percentage of cases going to trial, placing ad-
ditional burdens on an already strained justice system. 6
Clearly, changes in sentencing practices can alter the dynamics
of plea bargaining, sometimes in an unanticipated manner 7 Moreo-
ver, predicting the impact of proposed changes on litigant behavior is
exceedingly difficult. Indeed, the explosion in criminal trials pre-
dicted as a result of the operation of the Guidelines did not
materialize.28 However, DOJ's argument is facially implausible. It
requires us to believe that defendants will be materially influenced in
their decision to go to trial not by the strength of the evidence, the
potential length of incarceration they face if convicted, or the dis-
count in sentence they might expect to receive by pleading guilty, 9
but by the remote possibility of a partial acquittal and ensuing sen-
tence enhancement on the basis of acquitted conduct. This factor is
simply too speculative to be a major consideration for a rational de-
fendant. Moreover, limited empirical evidence currently available
suggests that DOJ's concerns are overblown. The trial rate in the
Ninth Circuit, the only circuit in which use of acquitted conduct is not
253. See supra notes 165-98 and accompanying text.
254. See Pauley Statement, supra note 220, at 6-7.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See Schuihofer & Nagel, Negotiated Pleas, supra note 233, at 271-86 (discussing
changes in plea bargaining practices associated with the Guidelines).
258. For example, in Fiscal Year 1994, the guilty plea rate of 90.5% was several percent-
age points higher than the guilty plea rate prevailing in pre-Guidelines practice. See 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 210, at 47 fig. D).
259. See Breyer, supra note 236, at 28-29 (highlighting the fact that the Guidelines' two-
level discount for "acceptance of responsibility" effectively amounts to a 20-30% sentence
reduction for pleading guilty). But see U.S. SENTENCING GUDEUNES MANUAL § 3BE1.1,
appendix notes 2-3 (1995) (providing that acceptance of responsibility adjustment may some-
times apply to a defendant who goes to trial, and may sometimes be denied to a defendant
who pleads guilty).
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permitted, was only 6.4% in fiscal year 1994,'w nearly three percent-
age points below the national rate of 9.5 %. 1
Second, DOJ contends that eliminating the availability of acquit-
ted conduct evidence at sentencing might alter prosecutorial charging
decisions, in its words, "creat[ing] a temptation for prosecutors to
decline to bring charges that they fear could result in acquittal and
wait to bring supporting facts to the court's attention at sentenc-
ing."22 If true, this threat of prosecutorial sandbagging of defendants
has troubling implications; it suggests a view of prosecutorial deci-
sion-making grounded primarily in raw tactical considerations, and
which is beyond the control of DOJ officials in Washington. If this is,
in fact, how federal prosecutors operate, systemic sentencing dispari-
ties may be arising from the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that
neither the Commission, nor anyone else, is currently capable of ad-
dressing. Nevertheless, this objection, like DOJ's fear of a reduction
in guilty pleas, is rather implausible. It suggests that prosecutors who
believe evidence of criminal activity is strong enough to convince a
judge to impose criminal sanctions would forego the opportunity for
a conviction, merely for tactical sentencing purposes. This view of
prosecutorial decision-making is inconsistent with a recent study of
plea practices under the Guidelines which suggests: (1) that prosecu-
tors focus primarily on conviction rather than sentencing; and (2)
that to the extent prosecutors focus on Guidelines sentencing, they
generally act in concert with defense attorneys to minimize sentenc-
ing exposure.2 In other words, while it theoretically would be'
possible for prosecutors to sandbag defendants in the manner sug-
gested by DOJ, studies of their actual behavior suggest that they will
be unlikely to do so.
Moreover, even if DOJ is correct, this argument does not coun-
260. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 210, at 50 tbl.18.
261. See id at 47 fig. D. Of course, this simple comparison does not control for a host of
other factors that might influence guilty plea rates. It suggests, however, that a prohibition
on use of acquitted conduct is unlikely to provoke an avalanche of trials.
262. Pauley Statement, supra note 220, at 7.
263. Nagel & Schulhofer, Charging and Bargaining Practices, supra note 233, at 535,546-
48. Nagel and Schulhofer found that prosecutors often reduce sentencing exposure to induce
pleas, and that many prosecutors exhibit a lack of familiarity with the details of the Guide-
lines, which results in reduced sentence exposure. See id Both the willingness to trade
available sentence exposure for a quick plea, and the lack of familiarity with the Guidelines
suggest that prosecutors are focused principally on obtaining conviction, and only secondar-
ily (if at all) on obtaining maximum sentence exposure.
264. See id. at 535, 557. Nagel and Schulhofer found that Guideline circumvention was
primarily a "covert vehicle for downward departure," and resulted from the desire to avoid
what prosecutors in particular cases perceived as unfair Guidelines sentences. See id. at 557,
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sel against elimination of acquitted conduct evidence in sentencing.
Although the behavior described by DOJ raises serious questions of
fairness and possible disparity in sentencing, it does not implicate the
central double jeopardy or jury integrity interests undermined by use
of acquitted conduct.w Moreover, if significant unfairness arising
from prosecutorial charge manipulation does occur, the best response
would be to address it directly, rather than simply to acquiesce to a
flawed status quo. If the proposal advanced here is adopted, the
Commission will be able to monitor closely the impact of elimination
of acquitted conduct on prosecutorial practices. If the sandbagging
feared by DOJ does occur, the Commission could then consider
amending the Guidelines to prohibit sentence enhancement .on the
basis of conduct for which federal criminal charges could have been
brought.' The need for such remedial action is unlikely.
5. Litigation over Verdict Scope
A final major objection to the proposal is that it might result in
uncertainties regarding the scope of the jury's verdict, generating liti-
gation over the preclusive scope of acquittals and increasing the
administrative burdens of the sentencing process.27  Although the
preclusive scope of acquittal is not necessarily always readily appar-
ent, this objection is insufficiently weighty to carry the day. The cases
in which acquitted conduct is potentially at issue are relatively fewY8s
In most of these cases, the preclusive effect of the jury's result will be
clear."9 If the defendant is convicted on one count of selling five
grams of crack and acquitted on two other counts, the weight of the
drugs alleged to have been sold in the two acquittal counts is not con-
sidered for relevant conduct purposes. This is straightforward. The
265. See supra notes 163-98 and accompanying text.
266. This is essentially the "infield fly rule" position advocated by Professor Berger. See
supra note 100. This Article does not advocate that position, in part because, as a practical
matter, the Commission is not ready to reexamine that broad a spectrum of real-offense
sentencing, and, in part, because of concerns about the workability of the proposal. Never-
theless, if DOJ is right about prosecutorial manipulation, this is a possible solution. In any
event, the threat of this solution may deter serious manipulation of the rules by prosecutors.
267. See Pauley Statement, supra note 220, at 5-7.
268. See 1993 Commission Meeting, supra note 10 (statement of Chairman Wilkins)
(stating that in his experience, acquitted conduct issues rarely arise). Unfortunately, the
Commission's data does not specifically track use of acquitted conduct, so exact figures on
the number of cases affected by this Article's proposal are unavailable. See generally 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 210.
269. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda, 981 F.2d 569, 571 (1st Cir. 1992); United States
v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 52-63 (discussing the
Pineda and Boney decisions).
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likelihood of confusion is further reduced by altering the specific of-
fense characteristics of provisions such as section 2D1.1 to conform
with their statutory counterparts.'0 It may further be reduced by the
use of supplemental special verdict forms in cases where such confu-
sion may arise.2 ' In short, litigation over the scope of acquittal-based
preclusion is likely to be limited. To the extent it does occur, it seems
a small price to pay for the benefits outlined in Part III(A) of this Ar-
ticle.
CONCLUSION
Some might argue that this proposal, which does not address
such issues as use of real-offense sentencing and evidentiary stan-
dards at sentencing, does not go far enough to solve the perceived
procedural deficiencies in Guidelines sentencing. Admittedly, elimi-
nating the use of acquitted conduct in Guidelines sentencing is a
relatively minor change that would affect a small percentage of cases
decided under the Guidelines. Nevertheless, its importance should
not be underestimated. Use of acquitted conduct creates an obvious
and easily understood appearance of injustice that cries out to be re-
dressed. The problems inherent in its use can be solved easily by a
Commission that is likely to be unwilling at this time to entertain the
possibility of broader procedural reform and the greater administra-
tive costs and other tradeoffs associated with such reform. Although
the Commission has rejected this limited reform once, it should real-
ize, upon further reflection, that use of acquitted conduct is a relic of
the pre-Guidelines era that disserves important interests. Its elimina-
tion is a painless way to improve the administration of justice and to
help fulfill the Guidelines' promise of illuminating and reforming
pre-Guidelines sentencing policies and practices.
270. See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
271. See Colleen P. Murphy, Jury Factftnding of Offense-Related Sentencing Factors, 5




APPENDIX I: SENTENCING TABLE---in months of imprisonment
Offense I H HI IV V VI
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3 (4, 5,6) (7 8,9) .(10,11,12) (13+)
Zone A 1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
4 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
5 0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
7 0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
8 0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
Zone B 9 4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
10 6-12 8-14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
Zone C I 1 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 27-33
12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
13 12-18 1 15-21 1 18-24 24-30 1 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 100-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-150
27 70-87 78-97 87-108 100-125 120-150 130-162
28 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 140-175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
39 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
40 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
42 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
__ 
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